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ABSTRACT

THE GEOGRAPHY OF URBAN AMERICA: SHRINKING CITIES,
RIGHT SIZING, AND NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE

Michael W. Ribant, PhD
Department of Geographic and Atmospheric Sciences
Northern Illinois University, 2018
Xuwei Chen, Director

Hundreds of U.S. cities, termed shrinking cities, suffered notable population loss during
the period of 1910-2010. The effects of such urban depopulation range from minor problems
associated with a weakened tax base or housing market, to major problems associated with
widespread abandonment and dereliction. A shrinking city literature that began in the mid-2000s
has grown significantly in recent years, however, it still struggles with defining which cities
belong in the shrinking city discussion, how urban systems unfold within a shrinking city, and
what strategies are best to put forth to rectify their problems. The objective of this research is to
understand how multidimensional urban processes unfold in shrinking U. S. cities across
different scales. Specifically, this research aims to 1) develop a better understanding of the types
of shrinking cities in the U.S., 2) examine the efficacy of right-sizing strategies in an iconic
shrinking central city, and 3) understand how neighborhood change spatially manifests in a
metropolitan area anchored by a large central city. To achieve those goals, this dissertation
conducted studies on shrinking cities at different scales by 1) developing a shrinking city
typology to help differentiate and illustrate heterogenous clusters of shrinking cities, 2) analyzing
the property tax foreclosure and auction process of the nation’s most iconic shrinking city,
Detroit, and 3) examining the spatial patterns of variables associated with income ascent and

decline within the largest shrinking city in the country, Chicago. The typology model uses a
Geographic Information System (GIS) and a K-means cluster analysis to identify seven types of
shrinking cities in the United States: 1) Large Shrinking Central Cities, 2) Inner-Ring Suburbs of
Shrinking Central Cities, 3) Outer-Ring Suburbs of Shrinking Central Cities, 4) Inner-Ring
Suburbs of Growing Central Cities, 5) Outer-Ring Suburbs of Growing Central Cities, 6) Small
Shrinking Central Cities in Small Metropolitan Statistical Areas, and 7) Small Shrinking Cities in
Small Micropolitan Statistical Areas. The foreclosure model uses spatial autocorrelation
techniques and a Geographic Information System (GIS) to assess whether Detroit’s foreclosure
and auction process benefits the city and fits within its stated right sizing planning goals. The
income change model used for the Chicago analysis employs a geographically weighted
regression technique to determine the spatially varying effect of variables upon per capita
income change within the neighborhoods and suburbs of Chicago. The seven clusters identified
in the typology model provide a new perspective for addressing the problems faced by America’s
shrinking cities, which could help inform solutions and strategies to address problems associated
with population loss. The foreclosure analysis finds that the foreclosure/auction process
currently operationalized in Detroit is inefficient relative to its stated right sizing planning goals.
The Chicago examination found that 1) the areas that rose the most in per capita income relative
to the overall Chicago metro area were the gentrified Chicago neighborhoods and sprawling
southwestern suburbs, while the city’s inner ring suburbs declined the most, and 2) the use of
GWR revealed hidden spatially varying associations between the explanatory variables and
income change. It identified that the income change had 1) a stronger positive association with
college education in the central city, distance to downtown in the suburbs, the percent of

Hispanics in the suburban fringe as well as a positive association with percent of AfricanAmericans in the central city and western suburbs; 2) a negative association with female-led
households everywhere except the northern suburbs and a stronger negative association with
foreign-born population in the northern and southwestern suburbs.
By conducting multi-scalar investigations of urban processes across and within U.S.
shrinking cities, this research contributes to the urban literature a deeper ontological
understanding of what constitutes a shrinking city and how groups of shrinking cities can differ.
It is worth noting how these multiscale results may intertwine. The shrinking city typology
presented in this dissertation may help inform research at smaller scales by providing
homogenized units of inputs of analysis. The lessons learned from problems in Detroit can be
applied elsewhere to shrinking cities either to address budding similar problems, or in a
preventative manner. The study of Chicago could provide insights into the spatially varying
effects of gentrification and its associated factors within the metropolitan area of a shrinking city,
revealing how neighborhood change evolves in American metropolitan areas generally, and in
shrinking cities particularly.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

1.1 Introduction and Research Objectives
The objective of this research is to examine some urban processes related to shrinking
cities in America. Though many definitions exist in the urban literature the term ‘shrinking city’
generally refers to “urban areas that have experienced population loss, economic downturn,
employment decline and social problems as symptoms of a structural crisis” (MartinezFernandez et al., 2012, 213). Shrinkage is often thought of as a Rust Belt or Manufacturing Belt
problem in the U.S. However, shrinkage occurs throughout the U.S. and, indeed, on a global
scale as well. Internationally since 1950, over 350 cities of over 100,000 in population have
shrunk by at least 10% (Oswalt & Rieniets, 2007). Current projections indicate that many cities
in Canada, Japan and Europe will suffer double-digit declines in population in the future
(Hollander et al., 2009). Whether it be a post-socialist city in Eastern Europe, an old industrial
center in Western Europe, or a mining town in East Asia, shrinkage can be found everywhere.
The causes of shrinkage are multifaceted and some are explored less in the literature than
others. Pure arithmetic tells us that an area will lose population if the total fertility rate drops
below 2.1, a demographic tenet that has afflicted most European countries as well as some
countries in other regions (e.g., Japan, Korea) (Biswas, Tortajada, & Stavenhagen, 2018;
Hollander, Pallagst, Schwarz, & Popper, 2009). Other cities shrink when the nearby resources
that drive their economy become depleted. Still other causes include war, post-socialist
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conditions and even natural hazards. But in the international literature, the more commonly cited
causes of shrinkage include the “globalization of the economy, global financial flows and the
internationalization of production processes” (Martinez-Fernandez, Audirac, Fol, &
Cunningham-Sabot, 2012). In the United States, which is the focus of this research, many large
cities began to decline in the 1950s as suburbanization took hold, fueled by new interstate
highways and federal mortgage guarantees (Jackson, 1985). Later, as deindustrialization took
root, cities that were largely dependent upon manufacturing or mining job shrunk when those
industries closed or relocated. In fact, it is deindustrialization that is most discussed in the U.S.
shrinkage literature because as Rieniets states: “Shrinking cities have been as much a product of
the industrial age as growing cities (Rieniets, 2009, 233). Once central city decline had taken
root in the U.S. by the 1960s, the literature developed an ‘urban crisis’ narrative to describe it,
thus obscuring the ‘shrinking city’ narrative which would not emerge until the early 2000s
(Mallach, 2017). Thus, shrinkage is not a new phenomenon, only the reluctant acknowledgment
of it is.
The delay of academics and particularly policy makers to recognize shrinkage as a real
process relates directly to the pro-growth paradigm that dominated planning in the industrial era.
Embracing policies geared towards shrinkage rather than growth seemed unnatural. But after
decades of urban decline and a shift to a service-sector economy, leaders and planners of
shrinking cities were forced to adapt. So, while the “current discourse in urban and regional
planning in the United States still displays a high affinity toward growth models”, shrinking
cities are beginning to reverse the growth paradigm by planning for population loss instead
(Pallagst, 2009). While acknowledgment of a problem is often seen as a first step, no consensus
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exists on the appropriate strategies moving forward. It is in this vein that this research is
conducted.
Shrinkage has been described a “multidimensional process, comprising cities, parts of
cities or metropolitan areas that have experienced dramatic decline in their economic and social
base (Pallagst et al., 2017). It is a complex problem occurring on multiple scales. Accordingly,
the purpose of this threefold research approach is to examine some of the urban dimensions
applicable to shrinkage across different urban scales. Under this purpose, this dissertation
performs: 1) a Geographic Information System (GIS) along with a K-means cluster analysis to
create a typology of shrinking cities at the national level; 2) a spatial analysis of Detroit
foreclosure data that may help to better understand how to implement more effective policies
than the current foreclose/auction system, and 3) an analysis of gentrification and income change
in Chicago and its suburbs, not to determine cause, but rather to examine patterns of associated
variables in both declining and growing areas. The conceptual framework for these three studies
appears in the next section and is followed a brief description of the research goals and expected
contributions of each study in the Summary section.

1.2 Conceptual Framework
1.2.1 Types of Shrinking Cities
The challenge of planning for urban shrinkage is the dearth of models about how urbans
systems are affected by population loss (Schilling & Logan, 2008) There is no consensus within
the literature on how to manage municipal decline in a shrinking city because cities are dynamic
spaces and no two are exactly the same. Furthermore, it is difficult to correct decades of decline
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with even the most innovative policy goals. Research is needed to know what cities are
declining as well as some of the common traits they share. Breaking a heterogenous group of
shrinking cities into mildly homogenous clusters can help identify structural relationships,
differences and commonalities across and within metropolitan regions.
The modern evolution of cities has led to great “complexity of urban processes” that
make “the need for classification techniques, more important than before” (Reibel, 2011). Urban
typology studies have been performed by Mikelbank (2004) on U.S. suburban places, Vicino et
al. (2011) on urban immigrant neighborhoods, and Hanlon (2009) on inner-ring suburbs, among
others. The shrinking city literature has grown tremendously in the past 15 years, yet a common
definition has to be agreed upon and very little work has been done in examining the differences
between shrinking cities. The large legacy cities like Detroit and Cleveland dominate coverage
in the press and literature (Sugrue, 1996; Ryan, 2008; Hollander, 2013; Eisinger, 2014; Williams,
2014; Akers, 2015; Clement & Kanai, 2015; Dewar, Seymour & Drută, 2015; Ferretti, 2015;
Gallagher, 2017a; among others), yet how do these cities differ from Flint or Gary? For one, the
former two cities have been able to develop sports entertainment hubs in the downtown area, a
strategy that is not available to the latter two cities due to their lack of professional sports teams.
There are racial differences that matter as well. Legacy cities, the older and depopulated
industrial towns, have populations “where African-American residents are usually both
disproportionately poor and under-represented in the city’s circles of power” (Mallach &
Brachman, 2013). This contrasts with shrinking cities in Appalachia and other more remote
urban areas whose population is mostly white.
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1.2.2 Right Sizing Strategies for a Shrinking City
The term right sizing is traced to Schilling and Logan (2008), but other terms are used as
well, such as smart decline, smart shrinkage and legacy cities. Typically, right sizing calls for
strategies involved with demolition and blight removal, preservation of open green space,
management of vacant land, and promotion of urban agriculture. The reasoning behind right
sizing is that the population of many shrinking cities is only a fraction of what it was say in 1950,
the peak population year for many cities, such as Cleveland, Detroit and others. Yet, city
governments must provide costly services across the same square mileage since the city has only
shrunk in population, not size. Hence, the term right sizing, its purpose is in “preserving
neighborhoods where market activity is still taking place, while preparing vacant land in other
areas for new uses” (Vey, Bradley & Austin, 2010). Morkel (2016) analyzed demolitions within
the city of Buffalo and developed an empirical model to prioritize demolitions within the city.
Shrinking cities must adapt a paradigmatic shift towards viewing “urban land as a key asset for
curbing wasteful, inefficient land use patterns, maximizing their built and natural assets, and
ultimately spurring economic growth (Vey, Bradley & Austin, 2010). Within this context,
Chapter 3 takes a similar approach towards the analysis of a right sizing strategy in Detroit, the
property tax foreclosure and auction process.
1.2.3 Neighborhood Change in a Shrinking City
The Chicago metro area experienced massive sprawl during the 1990-2010 time period of
this study as the urban fringe continued ever outward. At the same time, gentrification was
occurring within the city while some other areas were declining. The third part of this research
examines neighborhood change and gentrification at a metropolitan level in Chicago.
Specifically, it uses Geographically Weighted Regression (GWR) to investigate the spatial
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dependence of gentrification and its explanatory variables, which are related to age, race,
ethnicity, education, nativity, distance from downtown, housing stock, and household type. The
gentrification literature is deep and muddled, but to frame the examination, this research uses the
foundational theory of invasion and succession put forth by Burgess (1925) and Hoyt (1939),
which is pertinent not only because of its tested explanatory power, but also because Chicago
was the original setting for the theory’s development. The research also relies upon the classical
tipping point theory proposed by Farley et al. (1978), which is applicable to a variety of class and
socio-cultural groups. This research is particularly interested in following up upon recent
research holding that “racial integration that satisfies particular thresholds is the norm, at least in
Chicago, before meaningful reinvestment takes place” (Hwang & Sampson, 2014). This portion
of the overall research contributes to the literature by examining the spatially varying pattern of
gentrification and its explanatory factors across a metropolitan region, an area currently lacking
in the literature. It also contributes by using a methodology that incorporates both central city
and suburbs into the analysis, rather than solely examining the former as most studies do.

1.3 Significance of the Study
In order to unravel some of the dimensionality surrounding the issues of shrinking cities,
this dissertation presents three different studies about shrinking cities in the U.S. The main
contributions of these studies are as follows:
The first part of this dissertation, contained in Chapter 2, examines shrinkage at the
national scale. It aims to contribute to the definitional confusion extant in the literature as to
what actually composes a shrinking city, while also providing insight into whether shrinking
cities in the U.S. can be categorized into smaller, homogeneous subgroups. In doing so, this
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portion of the research asks whether shrinking cities differ and if so, how. These questions are
answered by implementing a typology meant to deconstruct some of the demographic and spatial
characteristics inherent within each shrinking city. While this portion of the research does not
intend to solve definitional debates about shrinking cities, it does hope to contribute to a better
empirical understanding of how shrinking cities differ so that policies may adapted accordingly.
The second part of this dissertation, contained in Chapter 3, examines shrinkage on an
intra-city scale using the City of Detroit for it study area. Specifically, it examines the spatial
manifestation of property tax foreclosures within the framework of the city’s stated right-sizing
plan. Right-sizing is a shrinking city strategy that manages space according to current
population levels, rather than hoped for future levels and in opposition to past growth strategies.
Detroit has acknowledged that traditional growth policies are ineffective given its severe decline.
Therefore it has adopted planning measures to address shrinkage. This research provides an
empirical examination of whether an unwanted but inevitable process in a shrinking city, the
auction of foreclosed properties, is managed in a way that aligns with its plan to manage
shrinkage. This research will help not only inform policy but also contribute to the
understanding and discussion of right-sizing processes in the literature.
The third part of this dissertation, contained in Chapter 4, examines neighborhood change
and gentrification in the communities and suburbs of the largest shrinking city in America,
Chicago. This research is scaled at the metropolitan level and asks whether there are
associations between gentrification, using per capita income change as a proxy, and commonly
used explanatory variables found in the gentrification and urban resurgence literature (Kolko,
2007; Voorhees Center, 2014; Furman Center, 2015; among others). Specifically, the
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explanatory variables relate to age, race, ethnicity, human capital, immigration, family status,
housing, and distance to the central business district. The dissertation also asks whether these
variables exhibit spatial variation across the study area. Understanding the spatial patterns of
gentrification and neighborhood change in a shrinking city can inform shrinkage planning
policies. This research contributes to the literature by examining, perhaps for the first time, the
spatially varying effects of gentrification and its associated factors across a metropolitan area.
To the author’s knowledge, no gentrification studies have attempted to model such nonstationarity. This study also contributes by using a methodology that incorporates both central
city and suburbs into the analysis, rather than solely examining the former as most studies do.
The concept of scale is often key in geographic inquiry. It is particularly so with this
research. Urban shrinkage begins at the global scale and filters downward. Globalization and
the international reallocation of both production and labor have produced widespread
consequences across towns, cities, and regions as they either benefit from these shifts or are
forced to adjust. This research jumps in to examine the latter group, beginning at the national
scale in the U.S. Specifically, it seeks to deconstruct the heterogeneity inherent across
America’s 367 shrinking cities, as delineated by the author from measures of population loss and
economic decline, to produce more homogenous sub-groups. In so doing, discovered knowledge
about group differences, be they stark or nuanced, can be used by planners, policy makers and
academics to create more effective policy at the local level. However, it is not merely horizontal
scale that is operationalized in the shrinkage process, vertical scale interactions unfold as well.
Individual case studies of urban shrinkage, as with those conducted in Chicago and
Detroit here, can help “align the research agenda on urban shrinkage with general strands of
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research in urban and regional studies” (Großmann, Bontje, Haase, et al., 2013). A component
of this research studies gentrification and neighborhood change across the metropolitan region of
Chicago. Most gentrification studies use only a central city for its study area, however,
“suburban disinvestment has been identified by a number of scholars as part of a pervasive
process of metropolitan restructuring” (Martinez-Fernandez, Audirac, Fol, & CunninghamSabot, 2012). By examining intra-metropolitan neighborhood change, this research gives nod to
the work of Hanlon (2009) and others who have documented the decline of inner-ring suburbs
and found uneven patterns of growth and shrinkage across metropolitan areas. This research also
recognizes that gentrification occurs in both growing and shrinking cities. In a large shrinking
city like Chicago, the displacement produced has been experienced first-hand by many residents
and they fear it. In Detroit, gentrification processes have yet to take root within the older
established neighborhoods, yet the residents still fear it. Though not directly the purpose of their
research, Großmann, Bontje, Haase, et al., (2013) asked if shrinkage fosters or hinder
gentrification and whether gentrification is an unavoidable cost of re-urbanizing shrunken central
city neighborhoods. While this research will not weigh in directly on those questions, its focus
upon the spatial patterning of gentrification may help others to weigh in.
The scale of devastation in Detroit brought about by population decline had made it the
iconic American example of an American shrinking city. Detroit’s decline is so severe that one
may wonder if it is the right laboratory for conducting shrinkage research due to concerns of
generalizability. But in fact, some scholars have argued just the opposite about studying Detroit:
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Phenomena that researchers might overlook elsewhere are pushed to the surface,
making them and their significance more evident. In this regard, Detroit serves
as an “extreme” case – an unusual circumstance whose study allows researchers
to develop a richer, deeper understanding of hard-to-observe phenomena. What
researchers learn in Detroit they can then test in other places. (Dewar et al.,
2015, 7)

1.4 Organization of the Dissertation

This research contains three related component studies and is organized as follows.
Chapter 2 develops a typology of U.S. shrinking cities to understand differences across and
within sub-clusters. Chapter 3 examines foreclosure data within Detroit to investigate whether
its auction process helps or hinders it right-sizing planning goals. Chapter 4 uses a
Geographically Weighted Regression model to better understand the spatial patterns of
neighborhood change and gentrification in the metropolitan area of Chicago, America’s largest
shrinking city. Finally, the conclusions, contributions, and integrative summaries of this research
are discussed in Chapter 5.

CHAPTER 2
A TYPOLOGY OF U.S. SHRINKING CITIES
2.1 Abstract
The literature on shrinking cities has significantly grown in recent years. However, little
work has been done towards the development of a shrinking city typology, which could help
inform solutions and strategies to address problems associated with population loss. With a
focus upon central cities, this article identifies 367 shrinking cities within the United States and
categorizes them using a Geographic Information System (GIS) and a K-means cluster analysis
to identify seven types of shrinking cities in the United States: 1) Large Shrinking Central Cities,
2) Inner-Ring Suburbs of Shrinking Central Cities, 3) Outer-Ring Suburbs of Shrinking Central
Cities, 4) Inner-Ring Suburbs of Growing Central Cities, 5) Outer-Ring Suburbs of Growing
Central Cities, 6) Small Shrinking Central Cities in Small Metropolitan Statistical Areas, and 7)
Small Shrinking Cities in Small Micropolitan Statistical Areas. The empirically generated
clusters, combined with associated social and demographic information, identify at-risk (and
“not-at-risk”) city types and provide a new perspective for addressing the problems faced by
America’s shrinking cities.
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2.2 Introduction
Though various definitions exist, a shrinking city “can be characterized and measured
based on population loss” (Rieniets, 2009). Beauregard (2009) states that the term shrinking
cities refers to population loss, rather than geographic compression. Thus, for example, the cities
of Detroit, MI and Coronado, CA can both technically be loosely defined as ‘shrinking cities’
since their current populations are below their peak census-year highs. However, the problems
posed by Detroit’s population loss are vastly different from Coronado’s, if indeed the latter can
even be considered to have problems associated with its population loss. This nuanced
difference lies behind the motivation for this study.
Fortunately, many large American central cities enjoyed historical peak population levels
during the 2010 Census enumeration (listed in terms of population size): New York City; Los
Angeles; Houston; Phoenix; San Antonio; San Diego; Dallas; San Jose; Jacksonville;
Indianapolis; San Francisco; Austin; Columbus; Fort Worth; Charlotte; El Paso; Seattle;
Nashville-Davidson; Denver; Louisville; Portland; Las Vegas; Oklahoma City; and
Albuquerque. As such, those cities are not considered in this study. However, many other
central cities, among those that are considered herein, were well off their peaks in 2010. Many
central cities peaked in population during the census year of 1950. The cities of Chicago,
Philadelphia, Detroit, Baltimore, Boston, Washington (DC), Cleveland, Minneapolis, St. Louis,
Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Buffalo and Rochester reached their all-time population peaks in that
census year. Hollander et al. (2009) succinctly provide an overview of America’s shrinking city
problem. They note that large-scale shrinkage of large and medium-sized American cities began
soon after World War II when the cities of Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit, Pittsburgh and St. Louis
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lost more than half their population; Baltimore and Philadelphia nearly a third; and scores of
smaller cities went reeling from population decline. According to Hollander et al. (2009), the
main causes of urban shrinkage in the U.S are suburbanization, the post-industrial shift from
manufacturing to service industries, and the resultant unemployment increases. Vey (2007)
eloquently describes the plight of certain American central cities:

While many of these cities have strong pockets of real estate appreciation and
revitalization, on the whole they remain beset by slow (or no) employment and business
growth, low incomes, high unemployment, diminishing tax bases, and concentrated
poverty—remnants of five decades of globalization and technological change, and the
dramatic shift of the country’s population away from the urban core. (Vey, 2007, 4)

It should be stated at that outset that there exists a large literature addressing urban
shrinkage both in the U.S. and abroad. A large part of the international discussion has centered
on the collapse of former socialist regions in Europe and Central Asia. For example, the decline
of cities in former East Germany such as Dresden and Leipzig, have received much attention.
However, just as with the U.S. literature, the international literature is also replete with
examinations of the relationship between deindustrialization and urban shrinkage, particularly in
the United Kingdom which was the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution.
Hollander et al. (2009) analyzed the issue of urban shrinkage by examining it causes,
assessing the recent literature, and proposing opportunities for future research. The authors noted
that urban shrinkage is not just an American Rust Belt phenomenon: “Over the last fifty years,
370 cities throughout the world with populations over 100,000 have shrunk by at least 10%
(198)”. Evidence of widespread urban shrinkage is apparent in the deteriorating economic and
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population trends which have afflicted not only the U.S., but Canada, Europe and Japan as well.
Though Hollander et al. (2009) focuses primarily upon U.S. cities, they include ample discussion
directed toward their German counterparts. The German causes of shrinkage are more complex
than those in the U.S., since they often entail post-socialist issues not applicable to U.S. studies.
After the 1990 German reunification, unemployment rates of over 20% in former East German
cities fueled a massive wave of migration westward. Some European research has examined
how these former communist cities adjusted to their shrunken population base, but the results
have been largely ignored in the United States: “These discussions take place in German
(amongst) the German intellectual elite, with few links to other countries’ scholars or
policymakers” (Hollander et al., 2009, 226). Notwithstanding the strong international literature
on urban shrinkage, the focus of this research is exclusively upon the manifestation of shrinkage
within the U.S. and any references made herein to “the literature” refers primarily to the U.S.
literature discussion.
The literature on shrinking cities has significantly grown in recent times (MartinezFernandez et al., 2012). However, little work has been done towards the development of a
shrinking city typology, which could help inform solutions and strategies to address problems
associated with population loss. The process of city shrinkage does not “follow a basic
homogenous pattern” (Rieniets, 2005). Thus, the purpose of this research is to help disentangle
those patterns by developing a comprehensive inventory of shrinking cities and classifying them
according to measures of income, race and ethnicity, education, city size, immigration and
employment. The results are expected to help clarify which cities meet the spirit of a defined
‘shrinking city’ as well as those whose inclusion only serve to confuse the definition.
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This article identifies 367 ‘shrinking cities’ in the United States. These are cities with
populations that had ever reached 25,000, but whose 2010 population level was below that of
any prior decennial census year. In addition, these 367 cities have experienced economic
decline. This research employs a two-step methodology to identify different types of shrinking
cities. Specifically, it uses a Geographic Information System (GIS) along with a K-means cluster
analysis to identify types of shrinking cities in the United States. The empirically generated
clusters, combined with associated social demographic information, may provide a new
perspective for addressing the problems faced by America’s shrinking cities.
This paper is divided in six sections. Section 2 contains a literature review which
examines the definitional aspects of the term shrinking cities, as well as a theoretical overview of
depopulation. Section 3 discusses the data and methodology, Section 4 analyzes the results,
followed by a discussion in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 summarizes the findings and discusses
directions for future studies.

2.3 Literature Review
2.3.1 Definitions of a Shrinking City
Separate from the term shrinking city is a term also found in the literature, “legacy city”.
Legacy city is used to describe cities that “have experienced profound social and economic
disruption as a result of fundamental shifts of the global economy in recent decades, and policy
decisions made at the local, state, and federal level” (Legacycities.org, 2017). Legacy cities are
defined as those cities having “lost between 20–70% of residents since their mid-century
population peak … where African-American residents are usually both disproportionately poor
and under-represented in the city’s circles of power” (Mallach & Brachman, 2013). A common
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affliction of legacy cities is the high number of vacant housing units that only seem to increase
over time. These cities are often the central cities of major metropolitan areas and were once
powerful manufacturing and industrial centers during the height of America’s industrial
revolution. Though an official list of legacy cities does not exist on their web site,
Legacycities.org defines them as “older, industrial urban areas that have experienced significant
population and job loss, resulting in high residential vacancy and diminished service capacity
and resources” (Legacyicities.org, 2017).
The literature contains many definitions of a ‘shrinking city’, yet a clear definition of the term
has yet to emerge. A common definition found in the literature comes from The Shrinking Cities
International Research Network (SCiRN) which defines a shrinking city as “a densely populated
urban area with a minimum population of 10,000 residents that has faced a population loss in
large parts of it for more than two years and is undergoing economic transformations with some
symptoms of a structural crisis” (Wiechmann, 2006; Hollander et al., 2009). Hollander (2011)
conceptualizes shrinking cities in his research in terms of population loss from one American
Housing Survey period to the next. Schilling and Logan (2008) also use the long-term to define
shrinking cities as urban centers that have suffered heavy population losses (25% over 40 years)
and blight. Beauregard (2009) analyzed shrinking cities geographically and measured them in
terms of “prevalence, severity, and persistence.” Still other definitions include “significant
population loss” (Rieniets, 2005; Beauregard, 2013) and “economic decline” (Pallagst, 2007). A
more long-term definition states that shrinking cities are “urban areas (cities and towns) or
regions (system of towns) that over the past 40–50 years have experienced population loss,
employment decline or/and protracted economic downturn until very recently” (Reckien &
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Martinez-Fernandez, 2011). The definitional view of Reckien & Martinez-Fernandez (2011) is
used herein, specifically, this research identifies 367 U.S. cities that have both lost population
and have had their poverty rate increase over the period 1980 to 2010.
2.3.2 The Causes of Shrinking Cities
According to Hollander et al. (2009), the main causes of urban shrinkage in the U.S are
suburbanization, the post-industrial shift from manufacturing to service industries, and the
resultant unemployment increases. However, the rise and fall of central cities, and some of their
suburbs, are only partly explained by shifts from manufacturing to services industries. Other
theoretical explanations exist for uneven regional development and the phenomenon of shrinking
cities, such as path dependence, agglomeration economies, and industrial structure. The
remainder of this literature review touches on these theoretical concerns.
2.3.3 Suburbs as Shrinking Cities
Unfortunately, the problems of urban shrinkage afflict not only central cities but suburbs
as well. A review of historical census data reveals that while 1950 represents the peak year for a
number of larger central cities, many smaller shrinking suburbs (population > 25,000) peaked in
the census year of 1970. Kenneth Jackson’s Crabgrass Frontier (1985) provides a sweeping
chronological account of the American suburbanization process from the early nineteenth
century to the late twentieth century. As an urban historian, Jackson’s focus is on the
decentralization, and later de-concentration, of American cities. Jackson describes how mass
transit facilitated suburban growth in the 1800s and how the automobile played a similar role,
though to a much larger extent, in the 1900s. He also reveals how cheap land and the assembly
line techniques of Fordism were applied to housing construction in order to enable the masses to
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acquire the American dream of home ownership. But perhaps his most powerful analysis lies in
his treatment of the federal government’s role in facilitating suburban home ownership, which
thereby fueled suburban growth through road development, mortgage subsidies and income tax
credits. This combination of federal assistance along with America’s drive-in culture created the
massive scale of suburban sprawl which has come to uniquely define twentieth century America.
Jackson attributes suburban growth to problems associated within the city core, rather than the
ideological allure of the suburbs themselves. He asserts that when the problems of the city are
viewed alongside the transportation and financial infrastructure put in place by the government,
the development of suburbia was inevitable.
While Jackson’s work provides a compelling and multidimensional account of American
suburbanization, it is mainly applicable to a defined period, not defined locations. More
recently, a general agreement has developed among urban scholars regarding a newer
understanding of suburban history that has yielded the following stylized facts: 1) there is
considerable diversity within and among suburbs, 2) the distinction between city and suburb is
now often muddled and 3) the suburban myth of the American Dream is open for definitional
debate and question (McManus and Ethingon 2007, 326). Using these assumptions as a
foundation, a new research agenda has developed acknowledging that the age of many suburbs is
only slightly different from their orbit city and, furthermore, that continued suburban expansion
has now placed many suburbs closer to the central city than to the fringe (Hanlon, 2009, among
others). As a consequence, while headline-making population declines such as Detroit’s
consume the popular shrinking city discussion, the fact that most of America’s shrinking cities
are in fact ‘suburbs’ goes largely unnoticed except among urban scholars. A shift in the
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literature has occurred which moves beyond a suburb’s founding, its remote setting, and its
appeal towards those seeking the American Dream, to alternatively examine the broader aspects
of its location (relative to central cities, surrounding suburbs and the metropolitan region as a
whole). Hanlon (2009) made a contribution to this evolving literature with a taxonomic
examination of inner-ring suburbs and this paper borrows from her methodology in identifying
and classifying shrinking cities, amongst which many suburbs are included.
2.3.4 Early Industrial Growth
Manufacturing began clustering in the late 1800s but later started de-concentrating in
response to falling transportation costs, rising land costs and globalization, so as manufacturing
firms spread out to the hinterlands in search of cheaper land, the services industries began
agglomerating within the larger cities (Desmet & Falchamps, 2005). The concept of how U.S.
industrial structure developed regionally begins with geographic concepts of spatial development
as described by Cronon (1991). First-nature geography, Cronon states, is concerned with the
physical geography of an area and can be considered a determinant of the location decisions
made regarding early economic centers as with, for example, the initial development of St. Louis
or Cincinnati as river trading posts. However, as time evolves, first-nature geography quickly
loses its explicative power relative to industrial development and second-nature geography takes
over, which concerns itself with the actors and agents involved in geographic space. Moving on
from Cronon, Krmenec and Esparza (1999) detail the history of U.S. industrial structure and in
so doing explain the causality of divergent economic regions. They argue that the diffusion of
industrialization, which had spread to the Northeast and Midwest regions of the United States by
the mid-19th century, did not take hold in the southern and western states. They cite Meyer
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(1983) to explain that the lack of population density in the rural south, and the dominant market
mechanisms already in place in the north, prevented the diffusion of industrialization to the
South. A map of American industrial locations in 1929 is shown in Figure 1. It is worth noting
here that a current map of large American shrinking cities would be almost indistinguishable
from this map, which was first published in 1936 (Hartshorne, 1936). As for the Western U.S.,
Krmenec and Esparza (1999) state that the mountain ruggedness, expansive aridness, and lack of
navigable waterways prevented industrialization from taking hold there. As the country grew,
the lack of industrialization within the West and South served to amplify the industrial
significance of the Northeast and Midwest, and launched their trajectories as the current home
for most of America’s shrinking cities.

Figure 1. Location of manufacturing cities, 1929 (Hartshorne 1936).
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2.3.5 Deindustrialization
The industrial complexes of the Midwest and Northeast, with their dependence upon
manufacturing, continued to flourish for decades until reaching their apex during the Fordist
period of the 1940s-1960s. What followed, is best described by Thomas Lassman:

By the 1970s, the American economy was in the midst of a wrenching transformation
that eviscerated once-venerable manufacturing industries on a scale not seen since the
Great Depression. The extent of the wreckage was unprecedented, as Pittsburgh, Buffalo,
Detroit, Baltimore, and scores of other communities across the country experienced plant
shutdowns and massive employee layoffs. No longer able to compete effectively in an
increasingly global economy dominated by more nimble foreign firms, American
producers of steel, automobiles, and other capital-intensive goods closed aging factories
and shifted their resources to new locales outside the Rust Belt. (Lassman, 2005, 350)
Deindustrialization had taken full hold by the 1980s. The determinants of
deindustrialization have been oft studied, but the primary determinants might be best
summarized as the effects of globalization, technological change, and the decline of the unions
(Green & Sanchez, 2007). Many firms in the North either closed, moved to the South, or
relocated overseas in an effort to remain competitive. Commonly used reasons offered for the
decline of the Northeast and Midwest in favor of the Sun Belt include the lack of unions, lower
wages, better weather, and a more pro-business climate (Crandall, 1988). Another reason for the
rise of the South and West beginning in the 1980s, and the decline of the industrialized
Northeast, is provided by Trubowitz (1998). Trubowitz eloquently argues that those three
regions have historically jockeyed for economic power by consolidating their political power
during three important periods: the 1890s, 1930s and 1980s. In the 1890s, the West and
industrialized Northeast teamed up against the South to institute an expansionist foreign policy
inviting foreign trade. In the 1930s, the agrarian South and urbanized Northeast favored
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internationalism versus the protectionist policies of West and its large domestic export market.
Finally, as deindustrialization took root in the 1980s, the West and South teamed up against the
deindustrialized Northeast to promote expansionism rather than retrenchment. Since the 1980s,
regional hegemony in the U.S. has accrued to the South and West to the detriment of the
Northeast.
Historically, as noted by Green and Sanchez (2007), manufacturing had provided the
middle-class opportunities for upward mobility, and had supported agglomerated economies with
its multiplier effects. While cities may have morphed from manufacturing centers to service
centers, Green and Sanchez (2007) remind us that the manufacturing sector still pays an
important role within the U.S. economy. Further light on this topic is shed by Hanson (2001)
when he states that while the death of manufacturing plants may feed the decline of a particular
region, the birth of new plants helps recreate a new cluster in a different region, proving that
second-nature agglomeration processes have replaced a region’s first-nature endowments as the
primary determinant of firm locational choice.
2.3.6 Path Dependence
Economic development does not evolve evenly over space (Krugman 1995) and this
differential development can often be traced to a city’s past, and more specifically to a concept
termed path dependence. The geographic concept of path dependence is used to help describe the
evolutionary process of unequal economic development involving places that are unable to
escape its past (Martin & Sunley, 2006). While examples of evolutionary path dependence
abound, perhaps none is more notable for purposes herein than that of Henry Ford’s decision to
locate his auto manufacturing plant in the Detroit area, a decision that reverberates still today.
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However, it is important for researchers to go beyond the mere description of a city’s path
dependence and into the analytics of forward strategies. Musterd et el. (2007) suggest research
into four “dimensions” of a city’s path dependence: 1) an economic dimension which analyzes
how a city can adapt to current macro-level trends given its current economic structure, 2) a
socio-demographic dimension which considers a city’s current population composition and the
challenges and strengths it presents for city growth, 3) an institutional dimension which evaluates
a city’s organizations (governments, trade associations, large companies, and universities) and
the prevailing norms and values of those institutions along measures of innovativeness,
entrepreneurialism, progressivism or conservatism, and 4) a built environment dimension which
seeks to find out how current city structure, layout, transport infrastructure, housing stock and
public spaces might affect future development. In the final analysis, no matter their particular
histories, some cities have adapted well and others have found it difficult to adapt the economic
structures from manufacturing to service based. So, while history is important in explaining a
city’s present and its possible path forward, it is important to remember that path dependence is
not historical determinism; choices are made along the way (Wilsford, 1994). Within the
literature, the theoretical gap left by considering path dependency is often filled with the theory
of agglomeration economies.
2.3.7 Agglomeration Economies
Agglomeration economies is a term used in economic geography to describe the
clustering processes underlying regional development and can be operationalized at scales
ranging from local to regional in context. Within the literature, its origin is usually traced to
Alfred Marshall (1890), who cited three external economies resulting from the clustering of
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firms around specific locations: (1) lower transportation and transaction costs arising from
improved access along the supply chain; (2) access to a large and qualified labor pool as well as
a shared public infrastructure; and (3) knowledge and innovational spillovers resulting from the
increased informational exchange between persons within close proximity of each other.
Marshall’s work, and its many derivatives, have proven quite durable over the years and remain
quite useful for explaining the unevenness of economic development across regions.
Rosenthal and Strange (2004) point out that 75% of Americans within the contiguous
U.S. live in cities which in aggregate accounts for only 2% of U.S. land area. This aggregation
of industry, capital and labor is manifested in numerous clusters across the country, for example;
furniture in North Carolina, high-tech in Boston, software in Silicon Valley, wine in Napa
Valley, and autos in Detroit, to name but a few (in fact, according to Kolko (1999), the high-tech
service sector requires agglomeration in order to be near a qualified labor pool). Since
agglomeration economies have been found to be the driving forces behind the growth of large
cities and regions, (Fujita et al., 1999; Scott, 2001; Melo et al., 2009), the existence and location
of these clusters play a significant role in which cities grow or shrink. However, while a city’s
human capital pool, in tandem with the existence of a beneficial agglomeration, has a lot to do
with whether it ultimately grows or shrinks, the role that agglomeration economies plays can be
hard to distinguish. Why? Because while agglomeration effects can drive the growth of large
cities, not all large cities grow. A paradox thus exists, whereby larger cities enjoy superior
efficiency relative to smaller cities, however, “the possible drivers of efficiency increases for
each city size, especially in terms of the capacity to change a city’s internal characteristics which
may act as structural constraints on its growth” (Camagni et al., 2016
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Even in the midst of desirable agglomeration effects, the population growth of certain cities
may remain unaffected due to spatial mismatch - the separation of the segregated minority poor
from decentralized job opportunities (see Kain, 1968; Kasarda, 1995; Mouw, 2000). The Spatial
Mismatch Hypothesis (SMH) was first formulated by Kain in 1968 (Sultana, 2005). The original
discussion of SMH centered on the disparity between minority workers located in the central city
and the ever expanding job market in the suburbs (Painter et al., 2007). SMH contends that lowskilled minorities residing in central cities are disadvantaged from procuring suburban job
opportunities owing to the decline of entry-level jobs in the inner cities, but also the inability of
the inner-city poor to gain access to suburban jobs. Factors compounding the SMH effect have
been studied as well, such as the lack of 1) public transportation infrastructure (Ong & Miller,
2005) and automobile access (Taylor & Ong, 1995). Reckien & Martinez-Fernandez (2011)
extended the SMH discussion to shrinking cities, noting that to tackle the SMH dilemma
shrinking cities must bring service sector as well as industrial jobs to their areas. As mentioned
before, many central cities peaked in population during the census year of 1950. Gobillon et al.
(2007) note that in that same year, 1950, central cities contained nearly 70% of metropolitan area
jobs, a figure that had dropped to merely 40% by 2000 (as measured in the top ten metro areas,
excluding centralized New York City). Detroit is a prime example of the SMH dynamic where
“an imbalance between available jobs and skills of central city residents, together with the
spatial, racial, and skill barriers to distant suburban labor markets, all conspire against AfricanAmerican employment” (Silver, 2015). Suburban Detroit has grown remarkably since 1950,
while the city itself has lost over a million residents. While Detroit represents an extreme of
SMH, in actuality, the relationship between growth in the central cities and their suburbs is more
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nuanced, with Leichenko (2011) finding that “suburban growth promoted city growth during the
1970s and 1980s, while city and suburban growth were jointly determined during the 1990s” (p.
322).

2.4 Data and Methodology
2.4.1 Data
The dataset for this study was compiled from the Minnesota Population Center (2018)
which provided data from the decennial U.S. census enumerations of 1790-2010, and the
American Community Survey 5-year estimates for 2011-2015 (U. S. Census Bureau. 2018).
Shrinking cities can be measured in the United States “by comparing the most recent population
data (2010 census) to earlier censuses holding the geographies constant” (Cox 2014). The
methodological approach used in this paper begins with this measurement. The list of shrinking
cities used here was derived from an initial dataset of 1,600 U.S. cities that had ever reached
25,000 people as counted by the U.S. Census during the decennial periods 1790 – 2010. Culling
from that list, 420 cities were identified that experienced a population peak before 2010.
However, population loss alone does not qualify for shrinking city status since population
decline must be accompanied by “employment decline or/and protracted economic downturn”
(Reckien & Martinez-Fernandez, 2011). Thus, to operationalize the definition and yield a final
qualifying count, the list of 420 cities was queried in a GIS to eliminate 1) those having a median
household income above $54,000 or a poverty rate below six percent, and 2) those which
experienced a decline in poverty rate since 1980. This query produced a list of 367 qualifying
shrinking cities.
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2.4.2 Using GIS to Develop Shrinking City Clusters
Census data for the 367 shrinking cities were entered into a GIS. The United States
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) delineates metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) and
micropolitan statistical areas (µSA) according to published standards that are applied to Census
Bureau data. The term core based statistical area (CBSA) is a collective term for both MSAs
and µSAs. An MSA contains a core urban area of at least 50,000 people, while an µSA contains
an urban core of at least 10,000, but less than 50,000, population. Because of their importance,
the initial methodological focus here was to identify which of the 367 shrinking cities were
considered central cities. The OMB designates the largest city in each MSA as a central city,
with additional cities qualifying for this designation if specified requirements are met concerning
population size and commuting patterns. Using OMB central city designations, the GIS
identified 139 of the 367 shrinking cities as central cities. This central city grouping was then
decomposed into two clusters according to population criteria: 1) Cluster 1A was assigned the
large shrinking central cities, while 2) Cluster 6 was assigned smaller shrinking central cities,
e.g., those under 50,000 in population or those that were smaller in population than the other
designated central city for a particular MSA. Next, a spatial query was conducted in the GIS to
locate all shrinking cities within five miles of a large central city. Depending upon whether the
central city was growing or shrinking, the identified cities were assigned either to Cluster 1B or
2B. Cities beyond five miles of a central city but within the same MSA were designated as
Outer-Ring and assigned either to Cluster 1C or 2C. By spatial definition, the remaining
shrinking cities were all located within an µSA and thus assigned to Cluster 7. The outcome of
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the cluster assignment methodology is shown in Table 1 and a representative map of all seven
cluster types is shown in Figure 2.
Table 1: The Seven Shrinking City Cluster Types
Central Cities

Inner-Ring Suburbs

Outer-Ring Suburbs

1A: Shrinking

1B: of shrinking

1C: of shrinking

(N=81)

central cities

central cities (N=38)

Non-Suburban Cities

(N=103)
N/A: Growing
(Not a Cluster)

2B: of growing

2C: of growing

central cities (N=20)

central cities (N=21)

6: Small central

7: Small cities in

cities in small MSAs

µSAs (N=46)

(N=58)

29

Figure 2. Cluster Typology Examples.
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2.4.3 Cluster Analysis
Long term structural adjustments are an important aspect of shrinking cities. Thus, in
recognition of the important function that central cities serve within a metropolitan area, a cluster
analysis was conducted on the cluster of large central cities (Cluster 1A) to help deconstruct
possible homogeneous groupings. The four variables used for this analysis relate to the current
poverty rate, poverty rate change from 1980 to 2010, employment change in the agricultural,
mining and manufacturing sectors from 1980 to 2010, and the percent foreign-born. The
descriptive statistics for these variables are shown in Table 2. The first three variables relate to
the employment decline or protracted economic downturn typically associated with shrinking
cities, while the percentage foreign-born population is used because of the important influence of
immigrant populations in stabilizing certain shrinking city populations. As Glaeser and Shapiro
(2001) found in a separate study of 1990s city growth, cities with more foreign-born residents
grew more quickly than cities with fewer foreign-born residents.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics.

Variable

N

Min

Max

Mean

Std Dev

PovChg8010

81

-23.59%

117.03%

42.66%

33.96%

PctPoverty10

81

11.73%

37.42%

23.70%

05.61%

ChgAgMfg8010

81

-04.89%

-46.26%

-23.57%

-08.34%

PctFoB15

81

01.29%

40.27%

09.60%

07.98%
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Clustering is the unsupervised classification of data into groups. As used here, clustering
divides shrinking cities into groupings whereby shrinking cities are similar to one another within
the cluster but dissimilar to those in other clusters. Two common clustering methods have been
used in the urban literature, hierarchical clustering (Mikelbank, 2004) and K-means (Hanlon,
2009; Vicino et al., 2011, among others). Each method produces different results, the main
difference between them has to do with their methodological starting points (Aldenderfer &
Blashfield, 1984). Hierarchical clustering begins by identifying cases as their own cluster and
uses a distance tolerance in the next step as an additive tool to form the second cluster based on
cluster variate scores. The additive process continues until all cases ultimately form one entire
group. As such, hierarchical clustering is computationally demanding and ultimately requires the
researcher to select the best clustering solution using tools such as an agglomeration schedule
and dendogram. The hierarchical clustering method is useful for starting-point analyses but does
not generally produce “homogenous and well-balanced” results (Arimond & Elfessi, 2001). Of
the two methods, K-means is more successful when there is a substantial body of previous
literature to inform variable input decisions (Dwyer, Gill, & Seetaram, 2012). As such, the Kmeans clustering method was chosen for this research since the input variables are well
documented within the urban literature and because of the prevalent use of K-means within the
urban discipline.
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The K-means clustering method is an iterative technique whereby the number of clusters
is chosen upfront by the researcher. K-means clustering is used to partition n objects into k
clusters. Each object it assigned to the cluster with the nearest mean, with the statistical
objective being to minimize total intra-cluster variance. Using a prespecified number of output
clusters (k), the technique produces exactly k different clusters of greatest possible distinction. Kmeans stores k centroids that it uses to define clusters and a point is considered to be in a
particular cluster if it is closer to that cluster's centroid than any other centroid. The membership
of the k clusters is not known as a priori and must be computed from the data. Hence, K-means
clustering is a type of unsupervised learning in that there are no predefined labels in the data nor
are there class values denoting a priori data groupings. In other words, the technique groups
objects in a population by similarity of the underlying data input, without the process being
driven by a specific purpose. Clusters begin as random groupings and subsequent assignments
are made based on variate distance. As such, each subsequent iteration changes cluster
membership. The iterations end when there are no more assignments to be made and the number
of predetermined identified clusters has been reached.
The K-means method requires an input of the number of clusters to be assigned.
Previous urban studies have used two, three, four, five or six clusters (Hanlon, 2009; Orfield,
2002; Short, 2007; Vicino et al., 2007; Vicino et al., 2011). There is no generally-accepted
operating principle to determine an optimal number. Choosing the number of k to use in Kmeans clustering is usually an ad hoc decision based on prior knowledge, with the caveat that
choosing too many k will result in “a needlessly complex description of the data, and in fact the
multiple centers capture the truth about the subset less well than one center” (Hamerly & Elkan,
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2004). A comparison and review of the outputs based on different k values is likely helpful to
determine a reasonable k value. Another methodological consideration is the amount of
membership in the resultant k groupings. For instance, a cluster with only 10 members is
probably too small a grouping to be practical, conversely, too many members can produce an
overly dominant grouping (Krantz, Korn and Menninger, 2009). Three separate cluster analyses
were performed to check for membership groupings using 2, 3 and 4 clusters. It was found that
using two clusters produced a relatively balanced membership grouping, with N ranging from 16
to 65. Therefore, this study specified two as the number of output clusters.

2.5 Results
2.5.1 Membership in the Seven Shrinking City Clusters

The name and membership numbers for each cluster are shown in Table 3 and the map of
all seven cluster locations is provided in Figure 3. Of particular note is that only 41 out of 367
shrinking cities exist in metropolitan areas where the central city is growing, a nod to the cityregion concept. Also, almost 13% of all shrinking cities exist in micropolitan areas, largely
removed from larger cities and major metropolitan areas.
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Table 3: Cluster Distribution
#

Reference Cluster Name

N
(367)

1

1A

Large Shrinking Central Cities

81

2

1B

Inner-Ring Suburbs of Shrinking Central Cities

103

3

1C

Outer-Ring Suburbs of Shrinking Central Cities

38

4

2B

Inner-Ring Suburbs of Growing Central Cities

20

5

2C

Outer-Ring Suburbs of Growing Central Cities

21

6

6

Small Shrinking Central Cities in Small

58

Metropolitan Statistical Areas
7

7

Small Shrinking Cities in Small Micropolitan
Statistical Areas

46
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Figure 3. The location of the identified seven clusters of shrinking cities.

Beside the quick identification of shrinking central cities, the usefulness of the typology
developed herein is that non-central cities are categorized largely by whether they are situated
within metro areas having shrinking or growing central cities. This allows for some easy pattern
identification. For instance, the following seven metropolitan areas account for 25% of all
shrinking cities in the U.S.: Chicago, Detroit, Boston, Minneapolis/St. Paul, Cleveland, St. Louis,
and Pittsburgh (Table 4).
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Table 4: Seven Metropolitan Areas Account for 92 Shrinking Cities in the U.S. (25%)
Shrinking Central
City (1A)

Inner-Ring Suburb (1B)

Outer-Ring Suburb (1C)

Chicago, IL

Calumet City, Cicero, Dolton, East
Chicago (IN), Elmwood Park, Evergreen
Park, Gary (IN), Hammond (IN), Harvey,
Lansing, Maywood, Niles, Oak Lawn (13)

Chicago Heights, Highland
(IN), North Chicago, Park
Forest (4)

Detroit, MI

Allen Park, Dearborn, Dearborn Heights,
Ferndale, Garden City, Hamtramck,
Highland Park, Inkster, Lincoln Park,
Madison Heights, Oak Park, Roseville,
Royal Oak, Southfield, Southgate, St.
Clair Shores, Taylor, Warren, Westland,
Wyandotte (20)

Pontiac, Port Huron (2)

Boston, MA

Cambridge, Chelsea, Everett, Lynn,
Medford, Somerville, Weymouth (7)

Brockton, Gloucester,
Lawrence, Lowell,
Portsmouth (NH), Salem (6)

Minneapolis/St.
Paul, MN

Brooklyn Center, Crystal, Fridley,
Richfield, Roseville, South St. Paul, St.
Louis Park (7)

Cleveland, OH

Brook Park, Cleveland Heights, East
Cleveland, Euclid, Garfield Heights,
Lakewood, Maple Heights, North
Olmsted, Parma, Parma Heights, South
Euclid (11)

Lorain

St. Louis, MO

East St. Louis (IL), Ferguson, Florissant,
Granite City (IL), Hazelwood, University
City (6)

Alton (IL)

Pittsburgh, PA

Baldwin, Bethel Park, McKeesport,
Monroeville, West Mifflin, Wilkinsburg
(6)

Aliquippa
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Before discussing the differences between the seven clusters, it is worthwhile to examine
how the entire group of shrinking cities (N = 367) differs statistically from growing cities (N =
1,079). Of course, the most obvious difference lies with population growth. On average, the
population of shrinking cities in 2015 was 22% off of their peak population. Demographically,
as shown in Figure 4, growing cities in 2015 had larger shares of Caucasian (73% vs. 64%) and
Hispanic (22% vs. 14%) persons than shrinking cities, while shrinking cities had greater
percentages of African-American persons (24% vs. 10%). The average growing city had a
higher number of foreign-born population (16% vs. 11%). There was also a significant
difference in median household income between growing cities ($60,447) and shrinking cities
($41,144), with shrinking cities having an average of 20% of its population living at or below the
poverty line compared to only 15% for growing cities. Differences in housing naturally show
that shrinking cities had higher levels of vacant housing (12% vs. 8%). Growing cities had a
higher percentage of owner-occupied housing (55% vs, 46%) and the median value of those units
were much higher in growing cities ($252,908 vs. $146,919). Also, the housing stock in growing
cities was much newer than that in shrinking cities. Finally, 1980 was the median year that all
residential structures were built in growing cities, as opposed to 1955 for shrinking cities. With
the clusters identified, this paper now turns towards describing the characteristics of each
shrinking city cluster.
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Figure 4. The demographic breakdown of growing (N = 1079) and shrinking cities (N=367).
2.5.2 Cluster 1A – Large Central Cities
The first cluster includes 81 large shrinking cities as shown in Figure 5. The vast
majority of Cluster 1A cities are located in the former Manufacturing Belt, now the Rust Belt.
This cluster is named the Shrinking Central Cities cluster. In terms of population, it is by far the
largest cluster of the seven, averaging 229,839 people, with a range of 50, 288 to 2,717,534
(Chicago). This cluster ranks highest amongst the seven clusters in unemployment and poverty
rate. It also ranks second most in population decline, averaging an 24% decline off of its peak
population (Figure 6). Representative of this cluster are the former industrial powerhouse cities
that are commonly referred to as Legacy cities. Low levels of professional employment, high
poverty and high unemployment are emblematic of the many former industrial towns belonging
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to this cluster. The few cities outside of the Rust Belt in this cluster are mostly in the Southeast
(e.g., Birmingham) and along the Gulf Coast. Unlike their northern counterparts, population
losses along the Gulf have occurred more recently, and the causes can be traced directly or
indirectly to Hurricane Katrina (e.g., Biloxi, Kenner, Pensacola) or the vagaries of business
cycle, as with the industrial towns of Beaumont and Galveston.

Figure 5. The location of Cluster 1A cities: Shrinking Central Cities.
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Figure 6. Population decline of Cluster 1A cities: Shrinking Central Cities.

2.5.3 Results of Cluster Analysis on Large Shrinking Central Cities
A K-Means cluster analysis was performed on the 81 shrinking central cities in the 1A
cluster. The four variables used for this analysis related to the current poverty rate, poverty rate
change from 1980 to 2010, employment change in the agricultural, mining and manufacturing
sectors from 1980 to 2010, and the percent foreign-born. K-means clustering has been used
often in the urban literature to identify clusters of U.S. suburbs (Orfield, 2002), firm headquarters
and branch offices in Australian cities (Sigler et al., 2016), urban places within Megalopolis
(Vicino et al., 2007), and urban immigrant neighborhoods (Vicino et al., 2011). The results of
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the cluster analysis conducted here show that Cluster 2 had a lower increase in the poverty rate
for the period 1980-2010 than Cluster 1 cities (Table 5). The biggest difference between the
cluster variables is that Cluster 2, labeled as Culturally-Transforming Shrinking Cities, has a
much higher rate of foreign-born population (23% vs. 6%). Cluster 2 had a higher level of
Hispanic (30% vs. 8%) and Asian (8% vs. 2%) populations as well as a lower level of AfricanAmericans (25% vs. 33%) and Non-Hispanic Whites (36% vs. 54%). Median household income
was higher in the Culturally-Transforming Shrinking Cities cluster ($42,888 vs. $37,229) as was
the median value of owner-occupied homes ($227,544 vs. $119,354), though home ownership
was lower (34% vs. 44%) and the average year of built housing stock was older (1947 vs. 1955).
Both clusters declined about 23% from peak population levels. The location of the cluster
members is shown in Figure 7. Note how most of the Culturally-Transforming Shrinking Cities
are located in the Northeast.
Table 5. Shrinking Central City Cluster Variable Values
Variable

Cluster 1

Cluster 2

N = 65

N = 16

Increase in Poverty Rate: 1980 - 2010

45.34%

31.79%

% Foreign-Born Population, 2015

6.20%

23.40%

Poverty Rate, 2010

23.74%

23.58%

% Change in Employment Sector (Mining,

-11.34%

-14.81%

Agriculture, and Manufacturing) 1980-2010
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Figure 7. K-Means cluster results for large shrinking central cities (N=81).

43
2.5.4 Cluster 1B
The second derived cluster is labeled the Inner-Ring Suburbs of Shrinking Central Cities.
As shown in Figure 8, nearly all of the 103 cities in this cluster are located in the Northeast and
Midwest. Essentially, this group represents the inner-ring suburbs of America’s Legacy cities.
The cities in this cluster have declined in population at a rate of 24%, nearly identical to the 25%
rate of the shrinking central city cluster. This cluster ranks highest in median household and per
capita income and has the second-highest median house value of the seven clusters. However,
these figures belie the fact that the poverty rate for this cluster has more than doubled since 1980,
the highest of any cluster.

Figure 8. The location of Cluster 1B cities.
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2.5.5 Cluster 1C
Cluster 1C is named the Outer-Ring Suburbs of Shrinking Central Cities. Naturally, the
spatial distribution of Cluster 1C is nearly identical to Cluster 1B except there are fewer outerring suburbs (38) that have shrunk than inner-ring suburbs (103) (Figure 9). Similar to their
inner-ring counterparts in Cluster 1B, this outer-ring cluster ranks high in per capita income.
The poverty rate for this cluster has increased by nearly 50 percent since 1980. The average city
in this cluster has decline 22 percent from their population peak.

Figure 9. The location of Cluster 1C cities.
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2.5.6 Cluster 2B
Cluster 2B represents the inner-ring suburbs of growing, rather than shrinking, central
cities (Figure 10). There are only 20 such cities and 12 of them are in California.
Demographically the cities in Cluster 2B have the highest percentage of foreign-born and
Hispanics and the lowest percentage of African-Americans. Since 1980 this cluster has
experienced a relatively low increase of 33 percent in its poverty rate even though it has the
highest percentage of renters (57%). Its unemployment rate is the lowest of all clusters. Cluster
2B has the highest median home value and its housing stock is newer than all but one of the
other clusters. These cities are more populated than all other cluster cities with the exception of
Cluster 1A. The average population decline for Cluster 2B cities is only 16 percent, compared
to an overall average of 23 percent.

Figure 10. The location of Cluster 2B cities.
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2.5.7 Cluster 2C
The cities in Cluster 2C represent the outer-ring suburbs of growing central cities.
Statistically and spatially, this cluster is very similar to its inner-ring counterparts in Cluster 2B
(Figure 11). Nine of the 21 cities in this cluster are in California. Demographically, like Cluster
2B, this cluster ranks high in percentage of foreign-born and Hispanics and low in percentage of
African-Americans. Also, its poverty rate has increased by only 31 percent since 1980 while its
percentage of renters is 53 percent. Of all seven clusters, the median age of this cluster’s
housing stock is the youngest, with 1964 being the median year for structures built.

Figure 11. The location of Cluster 2C cities.
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2.5.8 Cluster 6
Cluster 6 contains small central cities located in small metropolitan areas (Figure 12).
This cluster ranks low in per capita income and median home value. Demographically, it ranks
high in Caucasian population (70%) and low in Hispanic (6%) and foreign-born (6%)
populations. The average city in this cluster has declined nearly 25% in population from its
peak, which ranks second highest of all the clusters. The cluster ranks low in per capita income
and median home value and its poverty rate has increased by 50 percent since 1980. With the
exception of Cluster 7, the average population (38,710) of this cluster is the smallest of all
groupings. All cities in this cluster are located in the eastern part of the U.S.

Figure 12. The location of Cluster 6 cities.
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2.5.9 Cluster 7
Cluster 7 represents small cities in micropolitan areas that are largely removed from the major
metropolitan areas (Figure 13). The average population for this cluster is only 26,948. This
cluster is perhaps the poorest of all seven clusters as it ranks lowest in household income, median
home value, and college education. Demographically it has the highest percentage of Caucasian
population (74%) and the lowest percentage of foreign-born (5%) and Hispanic (5%)
populations. Since 1980 this cluster has experienced a 58% increase in poverty.

Figure 13. The location of Cluster 7 cities.
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2.6 Discussion
The maps for Clusters 1A, 1B and 1C show a nearly identical location pattern whereby
most cities in these three clusters are nested within the Rustbelt. The exhibited spatial pattern is
of course to be expected as there is a direct relationship, spatial and otherwise, between central
cities and their suburbs. The central cities of Cluster 1A once hosted prosperous core
manufacturing areas which in turn led to surrounding suburban development in the Cluster 1B
and 1C cities. The most commonly given reason for the decline of these three Rustbelt clusters
are deindustrialization and suburbanization (Rieniets, 2009). The rapid urbanization which
accompanied the industrialized period came to a halt in the mid to late twentieth century.
Though significant urban depopulation occurred in the Great Depression of the 1930s, only to
have growth resume in the 1940s, it is the period of 1950 to 1980 that saw the number of large
U.S. shrinking cities balloon (see Figure 14). In fact, the shrinking city phenomenon that began
in 1950 can only be described as having reached chronic status by the year 2000.

Figure 14. Large cities with population loss, 1820 – 2000 (borrowed from Beauregard 2009 –
large cities defined as the fifty largest cities in each decade).
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It is interesting to note that seven metropolitan areas anchored by shrinking central cities
contain 92 out the country’s 367 shrinking cities, while other large shrinking cities contain no
shrinking suburbs at all. Perhaps more interesting is that only 41 suburbs anchored by growing
central cities have shrunk in the U.S. Since many of these 41 suburbs are located in California, it
would be worth exploring in future research how ‘Chicago School’ and ‘Los Angeles’ urban
models are operationalized in shrinking city distribution.
The K-Means cluster analysis revealed the important role that immigrants serve in
America’s shrinking central cities. Immigration to the U.S. slowed around the time of the Great
Depression, putting a dent in city growth rates, until it resumed vigorously in the 1970s (Kotkin,
1999). Hispanic migration patterns in particular increased at this time and settlement patterns
soon extended beyond the Southwestern U.S., manifesting in unpredictable chain migration
paths. The 16 cities in the identified Culturally-Transforming Shrinking Cities cluster declined
in population at about the same rate as the 65 cities outside the cluster. In fact, the cities outside
the Culturally-Transforming Shrinking Cities cluster experienced a much higher increase in
poverty between 1980 and 2010 (45% vs. 32%). Undoubtedly, cities within this cluster would
have suffered even greater population loss without immigrant settlement.
The cities in Clusters 6 and 7 are smaller and are largely removed from major
metropolitan areas. Cluster 6 cities are located exclusively in the eastern part of the U.S., while
Cluster 7 cities are a bit more dispersed. About a quarter of Cluster 7 cities extend west beyond
the Mississippi River. Many of the Cluster 6 cities are former industrial towns in the old
Manufacturing Belt and about a third of the cluster’s cities are located in Appalachia. These two
clusters are very similar demographically and have the highest level of Caucasian population
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among the seven clusters. The major difference between the two groups is that most Cluster 6
cities were once industrial towns while Cluster 7 cities ranked lowest of all seven clusters in job
loss from the manufacturing sector. Many of the cities in Cluster 6 are older and were originally
settled for reasons related to first-nature geography, often along a river, later to become small
and isolated industrial centers. In partial contrast, Cluster 7 cities tend to be more rural in
character so the agglomeration effects operationalized within a metropolitan area largely escape
these cities. So while deindustrialization may be partially attributed for causing decline in Cluster
6 cities, the reasons for the decline of Cluster 7 cities tend to be more varied and location
specific.
2.7 Conclusion

Using GIS and a K-means cluster analysis, this paper identifies seven types of shrinking
cities: 1) Large Shrinking Central Cities, 2) Inner-Ring Suburbs of Shrinking Central Cities, 3)
Outer-Ring Suburbs of Shrinking Central Cities, 4) Inner-Ring Suburbs of Growing Central
Cities, 5) Outer-Ring Suburbs of Growing Central Cities, 6) Small Shrinking Central Cities in
Small Metropolitan Statistical Areas, and 7) Small Shrinking Cities in Small Micropolitan
Statistical Areas.
This research contributes a useful typology to the urban literature from which to launch
subsequent examinations of urban shrinkage. The derived seven clusters have an understandable
taxonomy that are both distinct from each other yet inherently related in some aspects. Clusters
1A, 1B and 1C are directly related in an intra-metropolitan manner. Clusters 1B and 2C relate to
Clusters 2B and 2C in an inter-metropolitan fashion. Clusters 6 and 7 relate to each other
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demographically and in size, yet the former has industrial roots while the latter is more rural in
character and diverse in historical development. In addition, this research identifies a cluster of
large shrinking cities in which the foreign-born population has ameliorated shrinkage and its
effects. This could help inform future studies investigating the links between shrinkage and
immigration.
It is hoped that the empirical results of this study may inform the shrinking city literature
and public policy by helping researchers and policy makers better understand the subtle
differences in shrinking cities and address possible solutions accordingly. A significant
contribution of this research is to help clarify definitional muddiness and provide a starting point
for identifying the different types of shrinking cities in the U.S. It may also serve to inform
strategies to address population loss, if in no other way than by clarifying that different types
exist.
As noted, the shrinking city typologies identified herein can provide a starting point for
future research. There are several proposed topics for further inquiry. For instance, why do only
seven, out of hundreds of metropolitan areas, contain over a quarter of America’s shrinking
cities? What is it about those seven central cities that differ from other large central cities such
as Washington, Baltimore, and Milwaukee which have no shrinking cities in their surrounding
metropolitan area? How is it that Chicago and Detroit, which have completely different
suburban interactivity levels, both serve a metropolitan area with multiple shrinking cities? Why
do cities surrounding growing central cities shrink? It is hoped that the typologies developed by
this research can help answer these and other questions related to urban shrinkage in America.

CHAPTER 3
PROPERTY TAX FORECLOSURES IN A SHRINKING CITY: RIGHT SIZING IN
DETROIT

3.1 Abstract
Detroit is a city in Wayne County in the state of Michigan that has lost over 1,000,000 of
its residents since 1950. The city has adopted right sizing strategies to combat the ravages
brought about by such large scale abandonment. This study analyzes a unique and specific
outcome related to such dereliction: massive property foreclosures based on a database of Detroit
properties that were foreclosed and put up for auction from 2002 to 2013. This research uses
spatial autocorrelation and hot spot detection techniques to identify the spatial patterns of
Detroit’s foreclosure activity, then examines those patterns within the context of Detroit’s
planning framework zones to determine process efficiencies and inefficiencies relative to the
city’s stated planning strategies. This research finds that the foreclosure process currently
operationalized in Detroit is inefficient relative to its stated right sizing planning goals and
suggests changes to address problems related to the tax foreclosure process in Detroit. The
findings highlight the shortcomings of tax foreclosure policy in shrinking cities and other urban
pockets of disinvested neighborhoods with weak property demand.
3.2 Introduction
The city of Detroit has undergone significant economic and demographic decline since
1950. Founded in 1701 and incorporated in 1806, Detroit was the fastest-growing city in the
world from 1900 to 1930, the 4th largest city in the U.S. from 1920 to 1940, and the 5th largest in
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1950 when its population peaked at 1,849,568. With a current population of 680,250 spread out
across 139 square miles, Detroit is the only U.S. city to lose over a million of its residents
(Author’s calculations based on census data retrieved from Manson et al., 2018). Vast portions of
the city currently lie in a state of abandonment and decay, to the point where Detroit has become
the iconic example of legacy city decline in both academia and the media. In July of 2013,
Detroit’s emergency manager filed for Chapter 9 bankruptcy protection, the largest such
municipal bankruptcy in the country, from which the city emerged in December 2014
(Declaration of Kevyn D. Orr, 2013; Farley, 2015). Moving forward from this point, Detroit,
like many legacy cities, must find a way to navigate high crime rates, poverty, blight, aging
equipment, a dysfunctional infrastructure, and outdated systems - all in the face of decreased tax
revenues (Galster, 2012; Declaration of Kevyn D. Orr, 2013; Mallach & Brachman, 2013;
Morckel, 2016). Various strategies have been proposed and implemented to fight the city’s
decline, including urban farming, open space greening, and blight demolition, land banking and
property foreclosure auctions. This paper focuses particularly on the latter, property foreclosure
auctions.
This research examines property foreclosure within the context of a shrinking city,
specifically, Detroit. In addition to evaluating annual foreclosure summary data provided by
Wayne County, the host county of Detroit, it uses spatial analyses to examine the spatial
properties of 89,554 foreclosures during the period 2002 - 2013. Moran’s I is used to detect
spatial autocorrelation in the global context, while the local Getis-Ord Gi * is used to identify
clusters. The results were then evaluated not only to decipher the variation of any found spatial
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dependency, but to empirically investigate how identified patterns relate to Detroit’s overarching
planning objectives.
The City of Detroit faces overwhelming challenges as it tries to forge ahead after
emerging from bankruptcy in 2014. While the city’s finances are better off because of this, that
benefit doesn’t directly accrue to its citizenry. Faced with one of the highest poverty rates in the
country, Detroiters continue to encounter hardships related to the property taxes on their homes.
These hardships endure whether they own the home, or rent it. State law requires the host
county, Wayne County in Detroit’s case, to foreclose on property that is three years delinquent of
property taxes. The purpose of this research is to analyze the efficacy of this foreclosure process
as it relates to Detroit and its stated planning goals. Specifically, this research asks whether the
foreclosure process in Detroit is aligned with its current right sizing planning strategies, namely,
consolidation, greening and land banking; and whether the foreclosure process helps meet the
stated goal of its planning document “to move toward a more efficient and sustainable city and
improve the quality of life and business in Detroit” (Detroit Future City, 2013). In so doing, this
research can help highlight the shortcomings of tax foreclosure policy in shrinking cities and
other urban pockets of disinvested neighborhoods with weak property demand.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 contains a literature review which
examines the events that led to the decline of Detroit as well as the property tax foreclosure
system; Section 3 discusses the data and methodological steps used in this study; Section 4
presents the results; Section 5 discusses the findings and implications of this study; Finally, a
summary of this study’s main conclusions is contained in Section 6.

58
3.3 Literature Review: How Detroit Arrived at this Point
3.3.1 1940s and 1950s
The narrative of Detroit’s decline must naturally begin near the peak of its ascent, the
1940s and 1950s, a period ingested with contradiction and irony. In 1945, Detroit’s population
was still rising and it stood as one of the world’s mightiest industrial cities, having been a major
contributor to America’s ‘Arsenal of Democracy’ and the winning war effort of World War II.
Yet, tears in the city’s fabric had already begun. In 1943, a mere two years before the war’s
successful conclusion, Detroit itself suffered a calamitous race riot which tore apart the city and
embarrassed the nation as 6,000 federal troops had to be sent in by President Roosevelt to quell
the violence (Sitkoff, 1969). The statistics from the three-day 1943 riot are telling: 600 persons
were injured, 75% of whom were black; 34 people were killed, 25 of whom were black and 17 of
whom were killed by Detroit’s predominately white police force; 1,800 people were arrested,
85% of whom were black (Sitkoff 1969). Scholars have attributed the underlying causes of
Detroit’s 1943 riot to the city’s housing shortage, a pervasive problem that particularly affected
the city’s black residents (see Sugrue, 1996, among others). Unfortunately, the housing shortage
affecting Detroit’s African-Americans only became worse after the 1943 riot as government
funded freeway construction and urban renewal programs were proposed and built, a process
termed by one early scholar as none other than “Negro removal” (Anderson, 1964).
3.3.2 Freeways and Urban Renewal
In the post-World-War II Rust Belt era, economic and social forces, along with public
policy choices, altered the urban landscape and helped drive suburban ascent to the detriment of
central cities. Facilitating the post-war suburbanization process was the federal government,
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who provided up to 90% of the funding for urban renewal, highway construction, mortgage
subsidies, and housing-related income tax credits (Jackson 1985; Ryan, 2008). The following
section outlines generally how that process unfolded in Detroit.
It is fitting that the Detroit area’s first strip of freeway was built during the early 1940s in
the Detroit enclave of Highland Park, near the site of the Highland Park Ford Plant, the nation’s
first moving assembly plant and thus the birthplace of Fordism. Construction of the Edsel Ford
(I-94), Chrysler (I-75) and Lodge (M-10) freeways soon followed and decimated many Detroit
neighborhoods from the late 1940s through the 1960s. One of the hardest hit neighborhoods was
Detroit’s Poletown area, a traditionally Polish immigrant neighborhood on the city’s near east
side. The decades-long spiral of Poletown’s population decline first began in 1955 with the
construction of I-94, a situation later exacerbated by the acquisition and razing of parcels for the
Detroit Medical Center in 1956, and later by the construction of I-75 in 1967 (Bukowczyk,
1984). The final blow to Poletown occurred in 1981 when the General Motors
Detroit/Hamtramck Assembly plant was built after Mayor Coleman Young successfully acquired
the necessary parcels to enable construction of the plant, removing 4,200 Poletown residents in
the process.
Using the Poletown incidents to frame his arguments, Bukowczyk (1984) enumerates
several ways in which Detroit’s politicians and planners exacerbated Detroit’s problems in the
mid-20th century. First, though Detroit suffered from economic developments beyond anyone’s
control, the tacit acceptance by Detroit's political leaders of its decline, particularly with regard
to a lack of policies to address the decline of the urban core, enabled the city’s demise. Second,
political leaders continually made land use decisions that eroded the population base needed to
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support local communities, either by demolishing large urban tracts or erecting physical barriers
within neighborhoods. Third, public policy decisions to build freeways or enable new
development in neighborhoods they deemed blighted “gave rise to a self-fulfilling prophecy” by
accelerating population decline in those neighborhoods (Bukowczyk 1984). In reality, the
decimation of Poletown notwithstanding, freeway construction and urban renewal projects took a
much greater toll upon black neighborhoods for the white population simply moved to the
suburbs.
According to Sugrue (1996, 47), Detroit highway planners avoided the disruption of
middle-class areas, but no such care was applied to black neighborhoods where highway
construction was deemed a slum-razing tool:
Beginning in the late 1940s, the most densely populated sections of black Detroit
were devastated by highway construction. The Oakland-Hastings (later Chrysler)
Freeway blasted through the black Lower East Side, Paradise Valley, and the
Hastings Street business district, wiping out many of the city's most prominent
African American institutions, from jazz clubs to the Saint Antoine branch of the
YMCA. The John C. Lodge Freeway cut through the Lower West Side, the
increasingly black area bordering Twelfth Street, and the heavily black
neighborhoods bordering Highland Park. The Edsel Ford Freeway, an extension of
"Bomber Road" which connected Detroit to the Willow Run defense complex west
of the city, bisected the black West Side, and cut through the northernmost fringe of
Paradise Valley. (Sugrue 1996 47)
Highway construction displaced thousands of black Detroiters in the 1950s, compounding
an already dire housing situation and, in effect, fueling the city’s 1943 riot (Sugrue, 1996).
Blacks that were renting dwellings located in the path of future planned highways were only
given 30-day notices to vacate, but were offered no relocation assistance. In a city already short
of housing stock, this made it even more difficult for poor blacks to find rental housing in other
parts of the city. Compounding their plight, the city began extensive urban renewal projects to
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remove the blight associated with the dilapidated and densely populated black neighborhoods
close to downtown. Land clearance efforts associated with renewal projects in Detroit’s Black
Bottom and Paradise Valley neighborhoods further aggravated the acute housing crisis facing
black residents (Sugrue, 1996). These projects included the modernist Lafayette Park (originally
called the Gratiot Redevelopment Site) and its successor projects (Elmwood I, II, and III), the
Douglass public housing projects, the high-rise Jeffries Homes, and the Medical Center Area
(Psarra & Kickert, 2012). These urban renewal projects, along with highway construction,
unseated tens of thousands of black Detroiters in the 1950s and 1960s and forced them to seek
housing within a city still clinging to its segregationist ways.
The travesty of Detroit’s mid-20th century highway construction and urban renewal
programs lies not in the destruction of the city’s sub-standard housing stock in African-American
neighborhoods, considered some of the city’s worst, but rather that those programs failed to
provide concomitant housing to the displaced. Detroit’s urban renewal goals were focused upon
removing blighted neighborhoods with little thought given to the people inhabiting them. The
lack of alternative housing that was both suitable and affordable forced many blacks to seek
shelter elsewhere, which in turn contributed to overcrowded slum conditions in other black
neighborhoods. Furthermore, redevelopment plans did not provide for the construction of a large
enough supply of low-rent housing to accommodate the displaced. As a result, Detroit’s
redevelopment efforts did not eliminate blight, it simply transferred it (Sugrue, 1996). As other
scholars have noted, during the mid-20th century, Detroit was not the only city in the nation to
have its black citizens afflicted by poorly planned urban renewal and highway construction
efforts (e.g., see Mohl, 2004). Detroit’s unique problem was that unlike its urban contemporaries
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like Chicago and New York, Detroit had “a dearth of low-rent apartments and public housing”
largely because “white single-family neighborhoods staunchly resisted the construction of
multiple housing” in their neighborhoods (Sugrue, 1996, 51). Ultimately, the planning and
political leadership displayed in mid-20th century showed a blatant disregard by those in power
for those who lacked any, and this would cost the city dearly in 1967.
3.3.3 The Civil Unrest of 1967
By the time of Detroit’s third riot in 1967 (the first occurred in 1863), the exodus to the
suburbs was well underway, though the riot certainly spurred it pace (Sugrue 1996). Detroit lost
about 180,000 residents between 1950 and 1960, for a seemingly modest 10% decline and it lost
18% of its population between 1950 and 1970. However, these statistics mask the fact that over
700,000 whites left the city during this 20-year period while nearly 360,000 blacks moved into
the city (calculated by author from data obtained from Manson et al., 2018). Thus by 1970,
nearly half (46%) of Detroit’s 1950 white population had left for the suburbs or elsewhere while
the city’s black population more than doubled (calculated by author from data obtained from
Gibson & Jung, 2005). The mass exodus of whites during the 1950-1970 period in Detroit
marked the one of the biggest out-migration of whites from any central city in U.S. history.
One of the areas blacks congregated to after freeway construction and urban renewal
displaced them from Black Bottom, Paradise Valley and the Cass Corridor was Detroit’s Twelfth
Street area located on the near northwest side adjacent to Highland Park (Langlois, 1983). It was
on Twelfth Street that the riot of 1967 broke out after a 3:00am raid on an unlicensed bar where a
party for two Vietnam veterans had taken place (Langlois, 1983). Fueled by decades of racial
injustice, the uprising (called by some a civil rebellion – See Sugrue, 1996) turned into the worst
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racial violence of 20th-century America (Capeci & Wilkerson, 1990). Its aftermath left 42 dead
and 7,231 people arrested and similar to the 1943 riot, the 1967 uprising happened during war
time, required federal troops to quell the violence, and inflicted the deadliest toll upon the black
community. Of the fatalities, 33 of 43 were black, half of whom were killed either by police or
National Guardsmen (Sugrue, 1996).
Efforts to restrain Detroit’s black population to certain parts of the city, either through
racially restrictive deed covenants, loan refusals to blacks in the suburbs and even whites in
black city neighborhoods (redlining), and efforts by grassroots homeowner associations were
successful into the 1950s. But in 1948 the Supreme Court held in Shelley v. Kraemer that
racially restrictive deed covenants could no longer be legally enforced (Plotkin, 2001) and efforts
to restrain Detroit’s black population began to unravel with it. With whites leaving the city in
droves beginning in the 1950s, and blacks from the south moving in, the geographic space of
black Detroit residents exploded from 1950 to 1970, and of course continued in the decades that
followed.
3.3.4 City-Suburb Divide
Until Mike Duggan’s election in 2014, an African-American had served as mayor of
Detroit for forty straight years (1974-2013). Coleman Young, the longest-serving mayor in city
history, served the first 20 of those years. Young was a polarizing figure, still reviled in
Detroit’s suburbs as racially divisive, but revered by many in the city as an iconic symbol of
black self-autonomous rule. To suburbanites, Young also represented corruptness, perhaps
because his Police Chief, William Hart, and Deputy Police Chief, Kenneth Weiner, were both
jailed for stealing $1.3 million, each, from the same police undercover fund, however, Young
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himself was never charged with a crime. Many of Young’s suburban foes characterized his
administration as wasteful and financially irresponsible, but others, including the Detroit Free
Press’ John Gallagher, viewed Young as the “most austere Detroit mayor since World War II,
reducing the workforce, department budgets and debt during a particularly nasty national
recession in the early 1980s” (Gallagher, 2013). Gallagher goes on to note that: “For critics who
want to blame Mayor Coleman Young for starting this mess, think again. The mayor’s
sometimes fiery rhetoric may have contributed to metro Detroit’s racial divide, but he was an
astute money manager who recognized, early on, the challenges the city faced and began
slashing staff and spending to address them” (Gallagher, 2013). Racial divisiveness aside, many
scholars support Gallagher’s view that Detroit was structurally too weak and irreparably
devastated by the time Young took office in 1974 to lay the blame for the city’s demise at his
feet (Sugrue, 1996; Martelle, 2012; Eisinger, 2014; among others). If Detroit’s situation was too
far gone for Coleman Young to salvage beginning in 1974, then the same logic should seemingly
be extended for most of his mayoral successors, except for Kwame Kilpatrick: “While it would
be unrealistic to expect Kilpatrick to reverse five decades of decline, the fact that he made the
city worse under the guise of austerity while actually lining his pockets and those of his friends is
what makes Kilpatrick the worst of the worst” (Austin, 2014). Kilpatrick resigned as mayor in
2008, later, in 2013, he was sentenced to 28 years in federal court on the additional charges of
felony mail fraud, wire fraud, and racketeering. Kilpatrick did not single-handedly ensure
Detroit’s demise, but he sped up the city’s eventual bankruptcy and in so doing handcuffed his
successors’ ability to provide even the most basic of services to the city’s residents.
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With the flight of whites and capital to the suburbs, businesses soon followed and by the
1970s downtown Detroit had become abandoned. Even the Detroit Lions left for the city of
Pontiac, the county seat of suburban Oakland County. As the most populous and wealthiest of
Detroit’s five suburban counties, Oakland County stands in stark contrast to its central city and
according to its County Executive, L. Brooks Patterson, wants nothing to do with it. Patterson,
the de facto “mayor of suburbia”, has built a career upon denouncing the failures of Detroit, and
the particular target of his ire has been, and continues to be, Coleman Young, even decades after
his death (McGraw, 2018). The fractured and acrimonious relationship between Detroit and its
suburbs, particularly Oakland County, may perhaps best characterized by an article appearing in
The New Yorker entitled, “Drop Dead Detroit!” (Williams, 2014). The article highlights the
views of Patterson who has led the county since 1992. The article insightfully captures the
essence of the city-suburb divide by documenting a litany of Patterson’s blunt and unapologetic
bluster, which is part Oakland County boosterism, part central city spite, all of which is
politically calculated to appeal to a large segment of suburban constituents who share a collective
feeling of disdain towards Detroit. Perhaps the most revealing utterance was Patterson’s
insensitive response to how Detroit could fix its financial problems:
I made a prediction a long time ago, and it’s come to pass. I said: What we’re
gonna do is turn Detroit into an Indian reservation, where we herd all the Indians
into the city, build a fence around it, and then throw in the blankets and corn.
(Williams, 2014)
For his part, Patterson has remained popular with his constituent suburbanites and was
named by the nonpartisan magazine, Governing, as “one of nine public officials of the year”
whose “pioneering use of a three-year rolling budget … allows the county to plan ahead for
problems rather than be forced to triage them in a crisis” (Williams 2014). As a result, the scale
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of uneven regional development favors the suburbs by a staggering amount, to the detriment of
Detroit. As Galster notes: “ In 1950 the median income in the suburbs of Detroit was only 3%
higher than that of the city. By 2000 the suburban median income was nearly 100% larger”
(Galster, 2012 p. 61 as cited by Eisinger, 2014).
Many believe that the Detroit metro area has yet to fully recover from the events of 1967
and that it has led to a staggering level of uneven regional development favoring the suburbs.
Worse, the divide that separates Detroit from its suburbs is something that “neither the Black
politically controlled central city nor White suburban leaders were willing to repair” (Jacobs,
2009). Detroit’s high unemployment is further complicated by the automobile-dependent urban
morphology of its metropolitan area, which in turn contributes to the poor job access endured by
the many Detroit residents without cars (Grengs, 2010). Grengs (2010) notes that the Detroit
metropolitan area is 1) “the largest urban area in the nation without regionally-oriented heavy or
light rail transit” and 2) that its public transit system is “unusually poor compared to that of peer
regions of similar population and historical development” (2010, 45).
Many of the problems Detroit faced came from the failure to view the
metropolitan area as unified community, where everyone was responsible for the
good of the whole. This was the reason that regionalists, planners and labor
activists wanted to restructure the region in the 1940s. Yet it was easier for
suburban communities to incorporate than for central cities to expand. Local
reliance upon the property tax encouraged middle- and upper-income taxpayers to
cluster in safe municipalities protected from the masses by restrictive zoning
ordinances. The American attachment to local control or ‘home rule’ could not be
shaken. Mild forms of regionalism exist. (Thomas, 2004, 92)
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3.3.5 Coleman A Young Airport
The inability of Detroit to properly steward foreclosed properties is drastically
highlighted by the city’s plan for Coleman A Young International Airport. Formerly known as
Detroit City Airport, the facility is situated upon 264 acres on Detroit’s east side, in an area close
to some of the most devastated neighborhoods in the city (Figure 15). Southwest Airlines began
flying in and out of the airport in 1988, but pulled out in 1993 when government-mandated
runway expansion did not occur. The last commercial airline to fly out of the airport left in
2000, but in 2016 the airport still serviced about 65,000 takeoffs and landings from private craft
(Ferretti, 2017). In 2015 the City of Detroit secured funding, about $2.2 million, to buy the
remaining homes near Coleman A. Young International Airport so that runway expansion could
begin (Ferretti, 2015). This seemed like the long awaited fruition of a 1994 city plan to expand
the airport, attract air carriers, and turn it into a revenue generator like so many other municipal
airports around the country, but as of this writing, the city hasn’t proceeded with the purchases.
The extent of airport’s mismanagement as it relates to parcel accumulation is investigated later in
this paper.
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Figure 15. Coleman A Young International Airport neighborhood.

3.3.6 Property Taxes in a Shrinking City
Detroit emerged out of bankruptcy in December 2014, which allowed the city to shed
fifty years of legacy costs related to accumulated debt and interest, as well as retiree pensions
and benefits. However, the path forward is fraught with challenges as the city must still navigate
between historically low property and income tax receipts. Since emerging from bankruptcy,
income tax collection has been taken over by the state, which helps boost compliance, increases
revenue and, in particular, makes it more difficult for city residents who work in the suburbs to
avoid paying the city’s income tax. Property taxes remain the problem.
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In 1951, property taxes accounted for 96% of total tax revenue, while accounting for only
35% in 2012 (calculated by author from data obtained from the Census of Governments, 2017).
Around the peak of Detroit’s population in 1950, property tax revenues could be relied upon to
finance city nearly all city services. Property tax revenues in 1951 were $86,065,000
($759,954,000 in inflation-adjusted 2012 dollars) while the city collected only $265,475,000 of
property taxes in 2012, for a net property tax revenue loss of an inflation-adjusted $494,470,000.
On a per capita basis, that averages out to $411 in property taxes paid for each Detroit resident in
1951, and $372 for 2012 Detroit residents (again, inflation adjusted). So, while the per capita
property tax revenue difference between 1951 and 2012 is seemingly moderate, the net revenue
loss of nearly a half billion dollars is staggering. The difference between 1951 and 2012 per
capita property tax revenues highlights two major problems facing Detroit: 1) when city
population declines, property tax collection declines, and 2) the per capita costs to run a
shrinking city increase greatly as the population decreases because the area under governance
remains fixed.
According to the Citizens Research Council of Michigan (2013), Detroit residents pay
property taxes levied by the city but they also pay property taxes to support a number of other
governmental entities, “including the Detroit Public Library, Detroit Public Schools, Wayne
County, Wayne County Community College, a number of special authorities, and the State of
Michigan.” Thus, while Detroit residents incur property tax rates higher than any large city in
Michigan, less than half of what Detroiters pay in property taxes actually ends up in Detroit’s
coffers to support city services (Citizens Research Council of Michigan, 2013).
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3.3.7 Right Sizing
Desperate times in shrinking cities call for unusual measures, known in the literature as
right sizing strategies. The term is traced to Schilling and Logan (2008), but other monikers are
sometimes used, such as smart decline, smart shrinkage and perhaps most notably, legacy cities.
There is a bit of salesmanship in the term - why would anyone want to wrong size? But cities
like Detroit have embraced these terminologies, as well as their associated strategies. “Rightsizing recognizes that some shrinking cities will continue to shrink and it would be advantageous
for these cities to plan for this shrinkage” (Hummel, 2015a). The acquiescence of cities in
forgoing traditional growth strategies to focus on appropriate right sizing measures is merely a
realistic nod to the daunting realities they face. Depressed real estate markets, high crime rates,
reduced tax bases, large scale abandonment, inexhaustible land surpluses, and an unskilled
workforce present overwhelming structural challenges.
Youngstown, Ohio was one of the first cities in the country to adapt right-sizing as a
planning strategy in the early 2000s (Parris Jr. 2008). Since then right-sizing strategies have
been adapted in a number of major cities including Buffalo, Baltimore, Cleveland and Flint,
amongst others. Youngstown’s plan incorporated the right-sizing strategies of demolitions,
greening and consolidation while facing unparalleled challenges and though the results have
been markedly mixed, one notable achievement has been the revitalization of its downtown
(Hummel, 20015a). Buffalo’s 2006 plan has “seven development priorities of which three of
those address the right-sizing paradigm directly ... (and) are transforming the city’s economy,
rebuilding Buffalo’s neighborhoods and repairing the fabric of the city through smart growth and
sustainability measures” (Hummel, 2015a). In 2001 Baltimore started a plan to acquire vacant
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properties through tax foreclosures with the intent of reselling them to productive owners,
however, it has met with mixed success as many of the properties ended up in the possession of
absentee owners content to rent out the properties, an outcome at odds with the intent of the
original right sizing plan (Hummel, 2015a). Cleveland has developed a large-scale farm (Blue
Pike Farm) within its border and in 2008 passed the Vacant Land Re-Use Pattern Book plan to
help manage shrinkage by assisting individuals and groups who want to create productive benefit
from vacant land in their neighborhoods (Hollander et al., 2009). In Michigan, the City of Flint
uses land banking as a tool for right-sizing and managing shrinkage Pallagst, Fleschurz, & Said,
2017).
Hummel (2015b) identifies the five most cited right-sizing strategies in the literature as
rehabilitation, demolition, consolidation, greening, and land banking. Rehabilitation and
demolition are important right-sizing strategies but current market conditions in Detroit render
them ineffectual to the tax foreclosure analysis considered herein. The core purpose of
rehabilitation is to facilitate redevelopment, but in many shrinking cites, Detroit in particular,
market conditions prevent the flow of restoration funds. Similarly, while demolition in a
growing city is regarded as a necessary step before restoration or redevelopment, in a shrinking
city demolition is simply a problem-driven process undertaken to remove blight since the costs
of property improvement would exceed the final value of improvements (Mallach, 2011). Thus,
while foreclosed properties in Detroit may be in need of rehabilitation, or of demolition to enable
future development, such considerations are currently not feasible.
More germane to the right-sizing options available to Detroit planners, within the context
of foreclosed properties, are the right sizing strategies of consolidation, greening and land

72
banking. Consolidation of residents to reduce infrastructure costs is a right-sizing strategy
intended to effectually promote the removal of residents from sparsely populated areas into more
intact neighborhoods. Many large shrinking cities, Detroit most notable amongst them, peaked
in population during the census year of 1950, but have retained their former urban footprint.
Thus, many shrinking cities are in the position of providing fixed-cost services to a diminishing
population base, in other words, less dense population density infers greater per capita
infrastructure costs. The relevance of this to the property tax foreclosure discussion is that
properties placed into auction can potentially be removed if located within low-density
neighborhoods.
The right-sizing strategy of greening lessens infrastructure costs by opening up areas of
the city to urban agriculture and other green uses while reducing service provision costs.
Foreclosed properties placed into open spaces (e.g., urban farms) require little infrastructure
from the city. The list of greening options available from vacant urban land is long and includes
trails and greenways, green spaces, forestry sites, community gardens, parks, solar fields, storm
water management systems, pavement removal, wetlands, and bioremediation (LaCroix, 2010).
Greening can assist cities with land banking their parcel inventory at low cost until market
conditions improve and in some instances can help ameliorate short-term property values. For
instance, Nicholls (2004) found that nearby parks can improve home values by 10%,
Land banks are public entities, rather than financial institutions, whose sole function is to
acquire, maintain or repurpose vacant and foreclosed properties. Abandoned properties depress
property values and discourage property ownership. A land bank is an oft-used tool that helps
retool acquired properties into (tax) revenue-generating assets in the ideal case, or to at least
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remove the blight associated with a property and inventory it until market conditions and/or
planning goals favor its future development. Land banks “act as an economic and community
development tool to revitalize blighted neighborhoods and business districts … (which) can
benefit urban schools, improve tax revenues, expand housing opportunities, remove public
nuisances, assist in crime prevention and promote economic development” (De Wit, 2008).
The Wayne County Treasurer’s office handles the tax foreclosure process and auction on
behalf of its constituent cities, including Detroit, whose properties comprise the vast majority of
involved parcels. According to Cwiek (2017), since 2009 Wayne County has foreclosed on tens
of thousands of homes, the vast majority in Detroit, representing about one in four of properties
within the city. Recently, in September 2017, the county put up about 6,000 properties for its
online auction, down from previous years, but undoubtedly only because about 30,000 were
withdrawn from the auction process due to payment plan arrangements, amongst other reasons.
State law requires the county to foreclose on properties whose owners are delinquent for three
years, however, a common citizen complaint is that the process need not be so harsh, for
“treasurers and other elected officials have the authority to take other measures until the larger
system can be retooled” (Cwiek, 2017).
In Wayne County, properties are auctioned after a judgment of foreclosure, about half of
which contain residential structures (Dewar, 2009). In the past, the starting bid for properties
usually began at only $500. Properties that do not sell at three consecutive auctions enter into
the possession of the Detroit Land Bank Authority, which has not the capacity to sell, let alone
manage, all the properties it receives. Thus, the majority of properties held by the land bank
remain in limbo and off the tax roll. It should be noted that in the past the unsold properties
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were, by law, intended to revert to the City of Detroit, but the city refused them, so for years
Wayne County amassed a large number of unwanted parcels.
In a treatise analyzing county foreclosure processes, Dewar (2009) concluded that
programs such as Wayne County’s foreclosure and auction 1) fails to reduce the number of
owner-occupants losing their homes, 2) fails to strengthen neighborhoods, 3) encourages
multiple auctions on the same properties, and 4) ultimately fails to return individual properties to
productive use. In a later study, Dewar and colleagues further elaborated her position by stating
that “at each of the three stages of property foreclosure and disposition, implementers took
actions that promised to encourage disinvestment in property by facilitating the spread of blight
and encouraging negative externalities” (Dewar, Seymour, & Drută, 2015, 587).
The assessment of right sizing plans for shrinking cities is difficult since they differ in
purpose and scope from plans undertaken within the traditional growth paradigm. The goal of
the right sizing approach is “preserving neighborhoods where market activity is still taking place,
while preparing vacant land in other areas for new uses” (Vey et al., 2010). Defined as such, this
research assesses the efficacy of Detroit’s foreclosure process within the context of the stated
goals and right-sizing strategies of its planning arm, Detroit Future City.
3.3.8 Detroit Future City – The Plan Forward
The Detroit Future City (DFC) framework is a 347-page urban planning document
adopted in 2013 as a strategy for the city to deal with its massive population growth while still
pursuing achieve economic growth. The planning document classifies the city into Framework
Zones according to four main composite characteristics found across the city, framed by degrees
of existing and anticipated vacancy (see Figure 16). The detailed plan garnered widespread
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approval from municipal leaders who bought into its vision of strategies like greenways, parks
and urban agriculture. Opinions about the plan in the literature vary. Some in the literature view
the plan as a guiding light forward:
Two years in the making, this plan is nothing less than a watershed moment in the history
of cities. The plan's right-sizing approach is a bold and powerful way for this city of
714,000 people to address its future, untethered by decades of growth-based policy
commitments. While not without its flaws, the plan explodes with a new kind of urban
optimism. (Hollander, 2013, 1)

Others, however, see it as more of the same type of oppressive planning that has defined urban
renewal in Detroit:
The DFC proposes to phase out municipal services in large sections of the city, by
reclassifying their land use designations to agricultural and green zoning. Whereas
Detroit’s poorest and most isolated residents disproportionately reside in these
“innovation landscapes” of the future, these areas are not internally homogenous and
would negatively affect pockets of resilient residential life, already threatened by
rezoning and discontinued service provision. (Clement & Kanai, 2015, 2)
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Figure 16 : DFC Framework Zones (Detroit Future City, 2017).

In August of 2017, the DFC released a 77-page statistical overview of the city’s situation
entitled 139 Square Miles (referencing the area of Detroit). The report stated that 1) 37% of city
renters spend more than half their income on housing, 2) residents older than 55 make up 25% of
the total population, though the 25-34 age cohort increased by 10,000 new residents since 2011,
and 3) 24 square miles of Detroit lie vacant, not including abandoned roads or railroad lines,
shuttered schoolyards, or unmaintained parks (Gallagher, 2017a). The report’s implication is
that Detroit’s large number of poor and elderly residents cannot afford to pay their rent, though
help may be on the way if younger residents continue flocking to the city.
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The stated planning goal of Detroit Future City (2013) is “to move toward a more efficient and
sustainable city and improve the quality of life and business in Detroit” (p. 11). The planning
document produced by Detroit Future City (2013) is long and detailed, but if one looks closely
the document’s right sizing strategies of consolidation, greening and land banking can be gleaned
from its words:
“Introduce new and innovative land use typologies in high-vacancy residential
and industrial areas” 325
“The key is to be smart about how and where we locate and reinforce residential
areas” p 350
“Bus service for high-vacancy areas may need to be re-patterned” 371
“In high-vacancy areas, take some parts of the network off-grid” 381

The inference of the above statements is that population in low density areas will be
encouraged to move. A noted theorist within the shrinking cities literature has commented that
with this plan Detroit intends to “manage shrinkage by right-sizing it”, which means “focusing
money and resources around the islands of residential and business energy that remain in the city
and turning the rest back to nature” (Hollander 2013). Hollander goes on to note that residents
will be discouraged from staying in neighborhoods decimated by population loss so that these
areas can be converted to greening strategy use.
As noted above, past “urban renewal” efforts have been unsuccessful in Detroit as well as
in other shrinking cities. Furthermore, these efforts have hurt the city’s marginalized
populations. Understandably then, the City of Detroit’s current efforts to re-envision the city via
the Detroit Land Bank and Detroit Future City, are being met with resistance from certain
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pockets of the citizenry. It is beyond the scope of this research to fully evaluate the exhaustive
DFC plan that Detroit has now embraced. Rather, this paper examines property tax foreclosures
within the context of 1) the city’s stated goal “to move toward a more efficient and sustainable
city and improve the quality of life and business in Detroit,” and 2) the alignment of the property
foreclosure process with the right-sizing strategies of consolidation, greening and land banking
currently being implemented by Detroit (Detroit Future City, 2013). A few notable studies exist
that examine property taxes in Detroit, however, they are 1) focused on improving compliance
and predicting delinquency (Alm et al., 2014), and 2) examining the impact of property tax
delinquency on the sales price of nearby residential properties (Alm et al., 2016). A study by
Dewar (2006) compared the differences between Cleveland and Detroit in handling tax-reverted
properties and found Cleveland’s approach to be more efficient. Notwithstanding, no known
studies examine the property tax foreclosure process in Detroit with an eye towards spatial
patterns and planning alignment. Thus, since the city’s right sizing strategies differ according to
area, the results of this research are analyzed within the context of the city’s ten Framework
Zones, each of which have different planning strategies.
3.4 Data and Methodology
3.4.1 Data and Study Area
The study area is the city of Detroit, MI, the central city of the Detroit–Warren–Dearborn
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). Detroit is the nation’s 11th largest urban area, and the third
largest shrinking city (author calculation from Manson et al., 2018). Foreclosure data for the
period 2002 – 2013 were obtained in shapefile format from Data Driven Detroit (2017). This
foreclosure data was obtained as address point data. In order to ensure privacy and prevent
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reverse geocoding, the data was aggregated to the 2010 census block level. Census block data
and shapefiles for the year 2010 were obtained from the Minnesota Population Center’s National
Historical Geographic Information System (Manson et al. 2018). Finally, aerial imagery was
obtained from the USGS Earth Explorer (2017) website. All analyses were conducted at the
2010 census block level, except for the Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) method, which by its
nature smooths out foreclosure observations thus ensuring privacy.
3.4.2 Methods
Spatial analytical techniques and models are often used to identify spatial anomalies (hot
spots) in urban phenomena (Reis, Silva & Pinho, 2016). Here, the spatial dynamics of property
foreclosures in the City of Detroit between 2002 and 2013 were examined using Geographic
Information Systems (GIS) technology, specifically ESRI’s ArcGIS v. 10.5. The GIS maps
presented herein identify the density of property foreclosures by aggregating point level parcel
data to the census block level, which in turn were analyzed within the context of the stated
planning framework zones of Detroit Future City. These parcel level data were aggregated to the
2010 census block level. In total, foreclosure data for 83,281 parcels were examined.
This research employed a three-step methodology to examine property foreclosures in
Detroit during the study period. First, Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) was used to visualize
hot spots of foreclosure activity. Second, global Moran’s I was used to detect spatial
autocorrelation within the global context of the Detroit study area. Third, the local Getis-Ord Gi
* was used to identify statistically significant clusters of foreclosures as well as to reveal their
spatial structure. The results were then evaluated not only to decipher the variation of any found
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spatial dependency, but to empirically investigate how identified patterns relate to Detroit’s
overarching planning objectives.
3.4.3 Kernel Density Estimation
Kernel density estimation (KDE) produces a smoothed output of point density through a
nonparametric point conversion process. Because it does not produce tests of statistical
significance, it is often used for exploratory visualization (Rogerson, 2001). Kernel Density
Estimation (KDE) is a popular method for analyzing and visualizing point event distribution
(Silverman, 1986) partially because of its ubiquitous availability in major GIS software
packages, as with the Spatial Analyst Extension of ESRI’s ArcGIS, used herein. Previous
geographic applications of kernel density estimation include point pattern analyses of crime
distribution (Chainey, Reid, & Stuart, 2003), pedestrian crash zone detection (Pulugurtha,
Krishnakumar, & Nambisan, 2007), highway accident “hot spot” analysis (Erdogan et al., 2008),
and the visualization of population distribution (Wood et al. 1999), all using KDE within GIS. A
recent study used KDE to visualize the distribution of vacant properties and aggravated assaults
in shrinking city neighborhoods (Branas, Rubin, & Guo, 2012).
Kernel density estimation (KDE) is a spatial method that accounts for the location of
features (e.g., foreclosures) relative to each other. It is often preferred over count or proximity
measures since it transforms point data onto a continuous surface and permits feature density to
be estimated for any point of the map (Kloog, Haim, & Portnov, 2009). Here, KDE offers visual
analysis of the spatial patterns of property tax foreclosures by accounting for the spatial
proximity of foreclosures, without the constraint of geographic boundaries (e.g., census blocks).
KDE estimates a density at each point of a foreclosure per unit area using a set search radius.
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Values are then interpolated using a kernel smoothing algorithm in order to generate a
probability density function which when mapped depicts the spatial intensity of the foreclosures,
with higher values representing highly concentrated areas of foreclosures. The two parameters
which most affect KDE outcome are bandwidth (search radius) and cell size, with the former
considered the most important criterion (Silverman, 1986; Fotheringham, Brunsdon, & Charlton,
2000). Search radius choice will affect hotspot outcome locations since larger bandwidths will
increase the smoothing of the KDE hotspot map, thus degrading the power of the KDE hotspot
map to predict spatial patterns (Chainey, 2013). In ArcGIS the default output resolution is
determined by the coarsest of the input raster dataset. While a particular cell size may be
specified, inputs finer in resolution than the input dataset will create no new data, due to nearest
neighbor resampling. Since the default search radius (bandwidth) is calculated based on the
amount and spatial configuration of foreclosure points, it automatically corrects for spatial
outliers, thus avoiding an unreasonable search radius. Thus, the final search radius choice was
based upon the default search radius of ½ mile. The geodesic method was used for the KDE
rather than the planar method since the former is preferable for local areas not projected with the
purpose of preserving correct distance and area.
3.4.4 Moran's I and Spatial Autocorrelation
Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis (ESDA) as defined in Anselin (1994, 1999), is a
collection of techniques to discover patterns of spatial dependence, (i.e., clusters or hot spots).
ESDA is a data-driven analysis, not theory-driven, so while it is useful for identify spatial
patterns, it does not possess the capability to explain why they occur. Nonetheless, it is useful for
identifying patterns which can be later examined through a theoretical lens. Tests for spatial
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autocorrelation help identify the similarities of nearby values as well as to determine whether
objects are distributed in either a clustered, dispersed, or random geographic pattern (Longley et
al., 2003). Spatial autocorrelation can be expressed in two different perspectives: 1) globally, as
within the entire data extent, or 2) locally, as when determining hot and cold spots that may be
driving local cluster patterns, or reflecting data heterogeneity that is distinguishable from the
overall global pattern. Moran's I, proposed by Moran (1950), is one of the most commonly used
indices for measuring global spatial autocorrelation. The measure is able to detect whether
clustering exists within the data, though it cannot identify individual clusters. The Moran's I
statistic, a global measure of spatial autocorrelation (clustering), is defined as

where N is the number of spatial units indexed by i and j; X is the number of
foreclosures;

is the mean of X; and wij is a matrix of spatial contiguity. To preserve

confidentiality, foreclosure addresses were aggregated to the 2010 census block level (U.S.
Census Bureau, 2010). There were 83,381 foreclosures during the study period of 2002 – 2013
across 15,899 Detroit census blocks. Using the census block level as the unit of analysis
prevents identification of specific addresses while shifting locational coordinates only slightly
since census blocks in an urban area such as Detroit are very small. This aggregation ensured
privacy and provided a foreclosure count within each census block.
Following Anselin (2003), the first step in the analysis is to construct spatial contiguity
weights. Weighting can be achieved by defining neighborhoods as those within a prescribed
distance, or alternatively, by eschewing distance in favor of defining neighborhoods as those
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within K-nearest neighborhoods (closest observations), whereby spatial units that are within “K”
neighbors are assigned the value of 1, and 0 otherwise. The distance method is appropriate when
observations are regularly spaced and a conceptual basis exists for the selected distance
threshold, while the K nearest neighbors method is used otherwise (Nelson and Boots 2008).
Since property foreclosures in Detroit do not follow an even distribution across aggregated
census blocks, this study uses the latter method, specifically, it follows Nelson and Boots (2008)
in using K = 8 nearest neighbors.
After weighting, Moran’s I is calculated to determine geography’s effect upon the shape
of foreclosures in Detroit for the period 2002 - 2013. Positive spatial autocorrelation is shown
with positive values, negative values suggest dispersion, and values approaching zero indicate
spatial randomness or the absence of autocorrelation (O’Sullivan & Unwin, 2003). Depending
on its value, Moran’s I may indicate the existence of spatial clustering. However, as it is a global
measure, it does not indicate where the clusters exist. To detect possible clusters of foreclosure
activity, the local Gi* statistic is used.

3.4.5 Using Local Gi* for Foreclosure Hot Spot Analysis

Two well-known measures used to consider local forms of global indices are the local
Moran's I (also known as local indicators of spatial association, or LISA) and the local Getis-Ord
Gi * statistic. These methodologies were proposed by Anselin (1995) and Getis and Ord (1992),
respectively. Local Moran's I and Getis-Ord Gi* are similar in terms of the types of questions
that they answer and they both produce a calculated value for each observation unit, in this case
census blocks. The main difference between them is that Local Moran’s I is based on the
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difference between the value of an observation and the average value (Anselin, 1995), whereas
the local mean for Getis-Ord Gi* includes all features (Ord & Getis, 1995).

The formula for the Gi∗ statistic (Getis and Ord 1992; Ord and Getis 1995) is calculated
as:

Where, Gi* is the Getis Ord Gi* value for feature i; Wi,j (D)is the weight between feature
i and j; D is the distance between feature i and j; Xj is the frequency at location j; X is the
attribute value of an observation; S is the standard deviation of xj; and, n is the number of all
features. The Gi* method used herein is estimated by defining a spatial weighting matrix
delineating the neighborhoods over which relationships are statistically evaluated. To be
consistent, as with the analysis at the global level, the Gi* values were computed using K = 8
nearest neighbors as the weighting scheme.
Hot spot analysis using the Gi* statistic tests the null hypothesis that foreclosures patterns
observed in Detroit emerged by chance, with rejection of the null evidencing defined hot spots of
significant foreclosure activity. In this study, identified clusters of significantly high foreclosure
activity were analyzed within the context of the framework zones put forth by the Detroit Future
City plan. In particular, the analysis focuses upon those census blocks identified as hot spot
foreclosure zones with z-scores greater than 1.96 (95% significance).
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3.5 Results
For the period 2002 – 2013, there were 83,381 Detroit properties foreclosed, involving
89,696 different auction transactions (Table 6). In fact, 6147 properties were sold at least twice
in the 12-year study period, 155 sold thrice, and seven properties were foreclosed four times. In
total, the data set represents 89,554 foreclosures, of which 12,462 involved multiple foreclosure
transactions. Put another way, 7.3% of properties were auctioned at least twice or more. and
many of these, if not most, sold for the minimum $500 (auction sales prices are not included in
the data). Foreclosure totals increased significantly beginning in 2009 as the Great Recession
began to ravage the city. While foreclosures sent to auction were only 2,039 in 2004, they
increased to 20,030 by 2012. Indeed, there would have been many more. However, because of
the sheer volume of foreclosed properties, Wayne County actually held back from foreclosing on
40,000 properties in 2012, and an additional 36,000 in 2013 (Kirtner, 2016).

Table 6: Foreclosed Properties Sold at Auction: 2002 - 2013
2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

247

2,489

2,039

2,090

5,100

2,251

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

4,100

8,008

11,588

13,001

20,030

18,750
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3.5.1 KDE Heat Map
The KDE method produces a smoothed map of foreclosure point density. While it does
not produce any tests of statistical significance, it is nonetheless useful for exploratory
visualization. A Kernel density heatmap showing the distribution of property foreclosures for
the study period appears in Figure 17. The map shows widespread hot spots of foreclosure
activity all across the city, particularly in the city’s northeast side. High levels of foreclosures
include the orange and red areas, which show large portions of the city having a rate of over
2,000 foreclosures per square mile for the study period. The only area not affected by
foreclosure activity is the greater downtown area, shown in blue along the lower middle part of
the city.

Figure 17: KDE map of property foreclosures in Detroit between 2002 and 2013.
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3.5.2 Global Spatial Autocorrelation Results
The global spatial autocorrelation analysis was conducted after the point-level parcel data
were aggregated to the 2010 census block level (Figure 18). Global Moran’s I for foreclosure
counts was positive and statistically significant (Moran’s I= 0.44; z=171; p<0.0001), indicating a
tendency for clustered rather than dispersed foreclosure activity among census blocks. Thus, the
null hypothesis that the spatial distribution of property foreclosures is random is rejected.
Rather, as is the case here, the spatial distribution of high values and/or low values in the dataset
is more spatially clustered than would be expected under random circumstances. This finding
allows for investigation of where clustering is occurring.

Figure 18: Property foreclosures per square mile in Detroit by census block,
2013

2002 -
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3.5.3 Clusters and Hot Spots Detection
Based on the foreclosure aggregated at the census block level and weighting scheme of K
= 8, Getis-Ord Gi* was used to identify statistically significant hot and cold spots, as well as to
map patterns of foreclosure activity. The results are shown in Figure 19. The map shows
multiple areas of significantly high levels of foreclosures (red tones) throughout most of the
city’s residential areas.

Figure 19. Significant hot and cold spots of foreclosure auction activity in Detroit, 2002-2013.
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There are also regions of significantly low foreclosure activity (blue and gray tones)
located mostly in nonresidential areas, such as in and around the greater downtown area
(Downtown, Midtown and New Center areas), on Belle Isle (a large island park with no
residents), and in various parks and industrial centers scattered about the city. The only
significant low area of residential foreclosures can be seen in the central part of the city along the
northern border of 8-Mile Road. This low foreclosure area contains the city’s most substantial
and intact neighborhoods, located directly north and west of the Detroit Golf Course, including
Green Acres, Palmer Park, Palmer Woods, Sherwood Forest and the University District. In total,
out of 15,899 blocks in Detroit, 2,306 (16.23%) have significantly high foreclosure activity, with
3,698 (23.26%) showing significantly low activity.
To discern possible relationships between foreclosures and housing vacancies, a Hot Spot
Analysis (Getis-Ord Gi*) was also performed on the percent of vacant housing for each Detroit
census block for 2010 (Figure 20). Of the 15,899 census blocks, 2,109 were identified as
significantly high hot spots (95% level). Notably, the location of these hot spots are highly
correlated to the foreclosure hot spot locations shown in Figure 19. In fact, 1,195 common
blocks are identified as both foreclosure hot spots and housing vacancy hot spots.
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Figure 20. Significant hot spots of percent housing vacancy in Detroit, 2010 (N = 2,109).

3.5.4 Census Block Hot Spot Aggregation to DFC Framework Zones
Figure 21 shows foreclosure hot spot locations aggregated to each of the ten DFC
framework zones. Individual framework zone/foreclosure data can be viewed in Table 7. Not
surprisingly, the highest number of foreclosures occurred in the Moderate Vacancy 2 and High
Vacancy zones. However, there are some interesting revelations when foreclosure data is
viewed alongside the hot spot aggregations. Notably, while the amount of foreclosures occurring
in Low-Vacancy 2 zone is 16% of the total, only 5.76% of the hot spot activity is recorded in that
same zone, indeed suggesting that the foreclosure activity in this zone is dispersed. On the
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contrary, the Moderate Vacancy 2 zone experienced 28% of total foreclosures, but 38% of the
foreclosure hot spots occurred there, suggesting intense clustering of foreclosure activity.

Figure 21. Auction foreclosure hot spots aggregated to the DFC Framework Zones, 2002-2013.
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Table 7: Foreclosures per DFC Framework Zone
Zone

'CEM' =
Cemetery

Foreclosures Total
Percent Census
per Square
ForeForeBlocks
Mile
closures closures Identified
as
Hot
Spots
0
19
0.02%
0

% of
Total Hot
Spot
Blocks

Median
HouseHold
Income

0%

$40,622

90

391

0.47%

0

0%

$38,976

1,607

22,099

26.51%

745

28.59%

$28,249

'IC' =
Industrial
Land Use
Change

149

387

0.46%

6

0.23%

$32,280

'IS' =
Industrial
Land Use
Strength

75

1,723

2.07%

28

1.07%

$33,736

'LV1' = LowVacancy 1

392

2,580

3.10%

8

0.31%

$52,947

'LV2' = LowVacancy 2

745

13,447

16.13%

150

5.76%

$40,399

'MP' = Major
Parks

4

316

0.38%

7

0.27%

$44,231

'MV1' =
ModerateVacancy 1

1,392

18,824

22.58%

675

25.90%

$36,271

'MV2' =
ModerateVacancy 2

1,684

23,566

28.27%

987

37.87%

$32,523

'GDT' =
Greater
Downtown
'HV' = High
Vacancy
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3.5.5 Properties Near Coleman A Young International Airport
Figure 22 shows aerial imagery of the airport and abutting neighborhood both in 1978
and in 2015. Note how the housing stock was still intact in 1978 but by 2015 had suffered a
devastating level of abandonment. In the half square mile neighborhood immediately abutting
Coleman A Young International Airport (shown in green in Figure 22), 388 properties were
auctioned during the study period, 24 were sold twice, and one was sold three times. At an
average price of $10,000, it would have cost the city at least $3,880,000 to buy all of these
properties on the open market. Knowing the city wanted the parcels for its airport expansion, it
is logical to conclude that many homeowners would have held out for much more than $10,000.

Figure 22: The neighborhood next to Coleman A Young International Airport in 1978 (left) and
2015.
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3.6 Discussion
As of 2013, the end of the study period for this research, nearly 78,000 Detroit properties
sat vacant or blighted, almost half (48%) of the city’s properties were tax delinquent, and nearly
20% of potential property tax revenue sat uncollected (Kirtner, 2015; Alm et el., 2014). The
intent of the foreclosure auction process is to reclaim lost income and regenerate property tax
income streams. However, according to Kirtner (2015), 78% of properties sold at the Wayne
County auctions since 2011 have fallen back into delinquency, precluding any tax payment
relief. Indeed, the results of this study show that 6,147 of the 83,281 auctioned parcels (7.3%)
later went back to auction. At first glance, that might seem like a large discrepancy, however,
one has to understand the nuanced difference between properties reaching delinquency and
reaching auction. And to understand that nuanced difference, the foreclosure process in Detroit
must be further explained.
The tax collection and foreclosure process for Detroit is handled by Wayne County,
which has delinquency problems far greater than most communities. That said, there are many
other counties containing shrinking cities with similar blight and delinquency problems and,
thus, in many ways the auction process for Wayne County is not all that unique (Kirtner, 2015).
On average, it takes about three years from continuous nonpayment of taxes for a property to hit
the county’s auction block. That three-year period helps explain the difference between the rate
of 78% of properties being delinquent citied by Kirtner (2015), and the 7.3% rate of properties
reentering the auction process found by this research.
A brief continuation of the Detroit foreclosure process is warranted to help couch the
results of this research. There are several opportunities along the way for missed property tax
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payments to be settled, though further penalties and interest accrue along the way. Eventually, if
the balance due is not paid by in full by March 31st of the third year, the property is foreclosed on
April 1st. Barring a payment arrangement made via a taxpayer assistance program, the property
owner loses all rights to the property. Wayne County uses a two-round process to sell its
foreclosed properties. The first round requires purchasers to begin bidding at the level of back
taxes. The vast majority of first round properties go unsold, then enter the second round at a
minimum price set by the county, clear of any back taxes. The historical minimum bid amount
for vacant or abandoned properties tended to be only $500. Properties not selling in the second
round are offered to the city, but Detroit usually declines to take possession of the properties, so
they revert instead to the Detroit Land Bank where they are placed into a variety of programs on
a lien free basis. At present, the Detroit Land Bank possesses 96,408 properties, or roughly 25%
of all Detroit parcels,
In 2009 the number of properties auctioned by Wayne County increased significantly to
over 8,000 and soon ballooned to over 20,000 in 2012. Ubiquitous posts on the internet during
that time promoted the idea that a house could be bought in Detroit, a major American city, for a
mere $500. Speculators flocked to the Wayne County auction. In the late 2000s, “one investor’s
properties accounted for 22 percent of the auctioned properties that returned to foreclosure,
suggesting to others that the Wayne County auction for Detroit properties “promotes speculative
buying by absentee owners, at the expense of renters and home owners, the latter of which is
usually unable to pay the cash bid price of their properties” (Dewar, 2009). Indeed, the
recidivism rate of properties entering and reentering both delinquency and auction supports this
notion.
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Of interest to this research is not only how properties enter foreclosure, but where. This
research found that 388 properties around the airport found their way into the Wayne County
auction during the study period despite the fact that the City of Detroit was actively pursuing a
strategy to assemble nearby parcels to enable its airport expansion plans. The lack of
coordination between Wayne County and the City of Detroit cost the latter millions of dollars in
acquisition fees, and much time. Had the properties simply been transferred to the City of
Detroit, millions of dollars could have been saved and perhaps the airport expansion could
already be under way, but the city is still struggling to get the airport development project off the
ground (Gallagher, 2018).
One of the more notable results of this study is that property foreclosures are clustered
and correlate to neighborhood decay since they exhibit similar spatial patterns to housing
vacancy in Detroit. This finding falls in line with the results of other studies; e.g., Alm et al.
(2016) examined the impact of property tax delinquency on the sales price of nearby residential
properties and found that unsold properties with a tax lien had a negative spillover of 5.1 percent
($12,872) on surrounding properties. Furthermore, they stated that the harmful effects of
property tax delinquency are highly correlated with mortgage foreclosure, a huge problem in
Detroit. A similar study by Seymour (2016) examined how bank disposition methods influenced
housing stability in Detroit. Specifically, he examined the post-foreclosure trajectory of real
estate owned (REO) foreclosure properties in Detroit the surrounding tri-county area from 2005
to 2013. He found that investor, rather than owner-occupant, purchases of REOs in the city were
more likely to be foreclosed upon in the future, thus destabilizing Detroit neighborhoods further.
He noted that such studies may challenge “lenders and government entities to devise property
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disposition practices that do less unnecessary damage to neighborhoods in cities where demand
is weak” (Dewar et al., 2015, 10).
The most important finding of this research is perhaps that the auction process in Detroit
is incongruent with the city’s stated planning goals as elaborated by the DFC. The DFC defines
Moderate-Vacancy 2 zones as those with weak residential markets and very low demand whose
areas verge on losing their residential character, while High-Vacancy zones are often isolated in
large fields next to illegal dumping sites in areas that have already lost their residential character
(Detroit Future City, 2013). According to the DFC, infrastructure capacity is the key to longterm success of its planning goals:
Although the transitions to new and innovative land use types will take 20 years
or more, there is a relatively pressing challenge now: In many areas that have
experienced long-term loss of people, homes, and businesses, with high-vacancy
levels or industrial abandonment, deciding the most appropriate capacity of
infrastructure systems in the future cannot be put off indefinitely. (Detroit Future
City, 2013).
The stated goal of right sizing in general, and the DFC plan in particular, is to phase out
municipal services in large sections of the city by reducing or eliminating population in certain
zones for purposes of service provision efficacy. What sense then does it make to offer on the
cheap through auction nearly 50,000 parcels in the High-Vacancy and Moderate Vacancy 2
zones alone, without generating significant tax revenues, when keeping those parcels helps
achieve your planning goals more quickly?
The Wayne County auction of tax-foreclosed properties is one of the most criticized
public policy processes in Detroit, resulting in the seizure of thousands of properties which in
turn causes widespread displacement and neighborhood destabilization (Gallagher, 2017b; Weyl,
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2017). In 2014 the Wayne County treasurer began foreclosure proceedings upon 62,000 Detroit
properties, 37,000 of which were occupied, which led to more homeowner evictions, housing
abandonment, blight and population loss (Mogk, 2014). This process has been repeating itself
annually since 2002, the beginning of the study period for this research, the effects of which have
been particularly pronounced post the Great Recession. But what should be done?
A policy fix to the Wayne County auction would no doubt be an arduous process
requiring cooperation from the State of Michigan since the auction is mandated by state law.
One proposed solution is to abolish the property tax in Detroit altogether. Mogk (2014) argues
that abolishing the residential property tax would end the crisis suffered by Detroiters, who have
one of the lowest levels of median household in the country as well as some one of the highest
unemployment and poverty rates. He also notes that the property tax structure in Detroit suffers
from inflated property assessments and that even with such bloat, property tax revenues make up
only 10 percent of the city’s budget (income tax, casino tax and state revenue sharing are the
primary revenue sources).
Still, abolishing Detroit’s property tax seems not only politically untenable, but desperate
and short-sighted as well. Downtown Detroit is rebounding and so are other select parts of the
city, though this resurgence has yet to manifest itself within the city’s residential neighborhoods
(McGraw, 2017). A recent opinion piece in the New York Times concurs: “As capitalism
returns to Detroit’s downtown in all its feverish forms, you can see the city materialize before
your eyes. It’s like watching hot lava cool… In Detroit, the future is still being written” (Larsen,
2017). It is not unreasonable to think that the recent wave of commercial investment may in time
spillover to the residential areas, as it has in other central cities. The abolishment of the city’s
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property tax now would deny the city significant tax revenues in the future when Detroit home
values may well rebound, thus inflating tax revenues.
Even Mogk (2014) admits that Detroit’s operating budget is lean and any lost revenue
from abolishing the property tax needs to be replaced. To that end, Mogk proposes the
implementation of a new local sales tax or excise tax to replace this lost revenue. However, the
shifting of local taxes does not represent a sound structural solution to the problem. Rather, two
other suggestions put forth by Mogk might bring about more efficacy. First, remove the favored
tax treatment that Tax Increment Financing (TIF) provides for downtown commercial properties.
This would allow the hundreds of millions of dollars that have into flowed into downtown over
the years to flow into the neighborhoods instead. Downtown Detroit is now a thriving
commercial success, TIF subsidies are no longer needed downtown. Detroit would be better
served by having those funds flow into city’s general fund where they can be allocated to the
neighborhoods. Second, remove the tax exemption for the substantial number of tax exempt
properties in Detroit which “receive the bulk of city services and pay for none of the costs, a
concession Detroit can no longer afford” (Mogk, 2014, 1).

3.7 Conclusion
Research on Detroit significantly advances urban studies, “not in spite of Detroit’s
decline but rather because of its decline” (Dewar et al., 2015). While urban geography is replete
with studies focusing on conditions of growth, much fewer studies examine how cities manage
decline (Galster 2012). The results of this study highlight the importance of extending the
discussion of how delinquent properties in Detroit are processed. As cited in Alm et al. (2016),
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there has been much urban research in shrinking cities, such as examining the negative effects of
mortgage foreclosures upon childhood outcomes (Been et al., 2011), health outcomes of
homeowners (Pollack & Lynch, 2009), and the foreclosure discount (Immergluck & Smith,
2006). However, research into the effects of the tax foreclosure process in shrinking cities has
been limited.
The intent of the foreclosure auction process is to “reclaim lost income and reestablish
the income streams from previously delinquent properties” (Kirtner, 2015). However, the results
of this study show that 6,147 of the 83,281 auctioned parcels (7.3%) later fell back into
delinquency, and according to Kirtner (2015), 78% of properties sold at the Wayne County
auctions since 2011 fell back into delinquency, precluding any tax payment relief. Furthermore,
the foreclosure system keeps pumping new owners into properties located within clearance
zones, while the city planners are working frantically to remove residents from these zones.
Inexplicably, the City of Detroit has missed numerous opportunities to acquire parcels in the
airport neighborhood cheaply, if not for free. The development of the airport could bring huge
revenues down the line, so it appears almost criminal to let nearly 400 parcels slip out of the
city’s coffers. Perhaps the most obvious indictment of the property tax foreclosure systems is
that 7.3% of foreclosed parcels end up being foreclosed upon again. Simply put, Detroit is
operating under a property tax foreclosure system that serves neither its citizens nor its own
stated planning goals.
In a treatise analyzing county foreclosure processes, Dewar (2009) concluded that
programs such as Wayne County’s foreclosure and auction 1) fail to reduce the number of
owner-occupants losing their homes, 2) fail to strengthen neighborhoods, 3) encourage multiple
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auctions on the same properties, and 4) fail to return individual properties to productive use. The
results of this study affirm her findings and further concludes that the overall auction process is
incongruent with the City of Detroit’s stated planning goals.
In summary, this article agrees with the suggestions of Mogk (2014) to 1) reduce the
large number of tax exempt properties which are currently receiving costly city services while
not contributing to the tax rolls and 2) remove the TIF policies currently benefitting downtown at
the expense of the neighborhoods. This article also adds a third policy suggestion: to place a
moratorium, renewable annually, on property tax foreclosures in Detroit. This would allow
home owners and/or renters to stay in their homes, give neighborhoods the opportunity to
stabilize during the resurgence currently happening in Detroit, remove the market scourge of
speculative and absentee owners, and provide a window to policy makers with which to gauge
the real estate market and to assess the direction of neighborhood decline or improvement. It
also would prevent more properties from being haphazardly accumulated by land banks, the
county, the city and derelict owners, all lacking a cohesive plan for right-sizing Detroit.

CHAPTER 4
GENTRIFICATION AND NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE IN CHICAGO’S
NEIGHBORHOODS AND SUBURBS, 1990 – 2010

4.1 Abstract
This research empirically examines neighborhood change, as measured by relative
change in per capita income for 335 Chicago neighborhoods and suburbs for the period 1990 to
2010. Its purpose is to examine the potential underlying factors associated with neighborhood
change, as well as gentrification, in a metropolitan region anchored by a shrinking central city by
analyzing the spatially varying impacts of explanatory variables commonly used in the
gentrification and urban resurgence literature. The typical research on neighborhood change,
employs global (OLS) regression models that ignore spatial autocorrelation in the variables and
thus cannot explore the spatial heterogeneity inherent across urban regions. By contrast, this
study builds both a traditional OLS regression model and a Geographically Weighted Regression
(GWR) model to investigate the spatial dependence. The dependent variable is change in per
capita income from 1990-2010 and the explanatory variables are related to age, race, ethnicity,
education, nativity, distance from downtown, housing stock, and household type. The results
demonstrate that the most gentrified area of Chicago was in the northern part of the city, while
neighborhood ascent in the suburbs occurred mostly on the suburban fringe as opposed to the
inner-ring suburbs where neighborhood decline was prevalent. These findings confirm previous
studies in the gentrification field. Furthermore, this research finds that minority neighborhoods
in Chicago did indeed gentrify, which challenges the findings of some previous studies. Finally,
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this research contributes to the literature by unveiling a gentrification methodology that
incorporates both central city and suburbs into the analysis. This could allow for a better
understanding of gentrification and neighborhood change throughout an entire metropolitan area
and assist future studies by uncovering previously unknown effects associated with
neighborhood change.
4.2 Introduction
Anyone who has recently visited Chicago’s vibrant Loop or Riverwalk might be
surprised to learn that Chicago is a shrinking city. Its population peaked at 3,620,962 in 1950
and by 2010 the city had lost almost a million of its population. The 2010 population level of
2,695,598 represents a nearly 26% decline over that 60-year period. Conversely, during that
same 1950-2010 period the seven-county Chicago metropolitan area, as defined by the Chicago
Metropolitan Area for Planning (CMAP), gained over 3 million residents and grew by over 62%
(Author’s calculations based on census data retrieved from Manson et al., 2018). During the
1990-2010 period many of Chicago’s suburbs increased dramatically in population, while within
the central city of Chicago some neighborhoods grew but many others declined. Many central
cities in the U.S. experienced similar patterns of population change during this same period.
Underlying the contrasts between population change within and between central cities and their
suburbs is the phenomenon of gentrification. The study of gentrification within the context of a
shrinking city is contentious, with some arguing that gentrification can save shrinking cities
(Wynn & Deener, 2014), and others arguing that it drives an already disadvantaged class of “low
income residents away from the resources and efficiencies found in urban density” (Brasuell,
2014). By examining gentrification in the Chicago region for the period 1990-2010, this study
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does not weigh in on its pros and cons, rather, it examines its spatial manifestation. Specifically,
using change in per capita income as a proxy for neighborhood change, the purpose of this
research is to identify the associations if ever between gentrification and commonly used
explanatory variables and to determine whether those associations exhibit spatial nonstationarity
(i.e., spatial variation) across the Chicago region.
The theoretical framework for this study is primarily centered around the work of
Burgess' (1925) invasion-succession model and Hoyt's (1939) filtering model. These time tested
models are useful for understanding class-based processes whereby working class residents
move into areas previously abandoned by higher-income middle class residents. This research
also extends upon the work of Farley et al. (1978) and Hwang and Sampson (2014) who describe
how white residents prefer not to move into areas with a threshold level of minorities. This
research contributes to the field of gentrification studies by investigating gentrification and
neighborhood change within the context of an entire metropolitan area, rather than a central city.
The foundational underpinning for choosing the entire metropolitan area is provided by
Davidson & Lees (2005) who note that gentrification happens not only in the central cities but in
the suburbs as well.
To achieve its research goals, this study uses Geographically Weighted Regression
(GWR), a spatial regression technique that models the relationship based on neighboring
observations rather than all observations in a study area. GWR allows the explanatory
coefficients to vary from the global values derived from traditional Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) regression and can thus demonstrate the varying spatial effects of the independent
variables. The explanatory variables used relate to age, race, ethnicity, education, nativity,
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distance from downtown, housing stock, and household type. Specifically, the eight variables
used in this study include the 1) change in percent of persons aged 22 to 34 from 1990-2010; 2)
percent African-American population in 1990; 3) percent Hispanic population in 1990; 4) change
in percent of college graduates from 1990 to 2010; 5) change in percent of foreign-born from
1990 to 2010); 6) distance from the areal unit centroid to downtown; 7) median age of built
structures; and 8) change in percent of female-led families from 1990 to 2010.
This study is divided in five sections. After this general introduction, Section 2 contains a
literature review which examines the ever growing literature of gentrification and neighborhood
change. Section 3 discusses the data and methodological steps used in this study. This is
followed in Section 4 by a presentation of the results along with a discussion. Finally, a
summary of this study’s main conclusions is contained in Section 5.
4.3 Literature Review

Glass (1964) is given credit for developing the term “gentrification” during her
observations of social structure and housing markets in London where she noticed the influx of a
“gentry” into lower income neighborhoods. A simple definition describes gentrification as “a
cyclical process driven largely, but not completely, by investment flows” (Lees, 2000). Lees et
al. (2008) further developed the definition as “the transformation of a working-class or vacant
area of the central city into middle-class residential and/or commercial use” (xv). Kolko (2007)
describes it as “ the upgrading of urban neighborhoods, especially neighborhoods starting from
low average income, low housing values, or high poverty rates (p. 1). The role of government
relating to gentrification is also controversial, since they essentially make policies and plans for
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urban space, not necessarily the people who inhabit it. Gentrification brings higher property
values and thus benefits owners and city tax coffers to the detriment of low income residents
who must flee the neighborhood due to rising rents. Increasingly, community activists are
having to battle the deep pockets of city hall and their political donors, the developers, in an
often futile attempt to prevent displacement.
4.3.1 Neighborhood Change and Gentrification
The neighborhood change literature, of which gentrification is part, is growing because
neighborhoods can acquire upward trajectories in different ways. Owens (2012), identifies nine
types experiencing upgrades: affluent neighborhoods, booming suburbs, diverse urban
neighborhoods, Hispanic enclave neighborhoods, minority urban neighborhoods, new white
suburbs, no population neighborhoods, and upper middle-class white suburbs. The simple
difference between gentrification and neighborhood ascent is that the negative outcome of
displacement occurs with the former, but not with the latter. While the gentrification literature is
large, relative few studies focus on causality by examining gentrification’s determinants.
Because the underlying causes can be different across different cities, it is hard to generalize
determinants across study areas using traditional OLS models:
Gentrification does not rely on a singular cause. It may emerge when three conditions are
present: the existence of a potential pool of gentrifiers, a supply of inner city housing, and
a cultural preference for urban living (Hamnett 1991). It is arguably a “chaotic” process,
that does not lend itself to binary or linear analysis (Zuk et al., 2015, 12).

Gentrification is commonly described as the displacement of the extant working-class by
the in-migration of a primarily white middle-class (Glass 1964; Lees et al. 2008). The pros and
cons of the gentrification process has been hotly debated ever since Glass coined the term in
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1964, particularly after stated the term began to appear in the literature during the 1970s (Furman
Center, 2015). Detractors of gentrification argue that the resultant economic improvement of a
neighborhood comes at the expense of rising rents, home prices and property taxes, which serve
to force out poorer residents (Lees et al. 2008; Goetz 2011). Proponents generally use the “it is
the rising tide that lifts all boats” argument coined by Duany (2001. 36), to support their
contention that the economic improvement of these neighborhoods, enabled by high income
gentrifiers, creates opportunities for and can raise the wealth of the current lower-income
residents (Freeman and Braconi 2004; Bryne 2003; McKinnish et al. 2008). Detractors argue
further that low-income residents are ill-equipped to take advantage of opportunities presented or
to capitalize on any economic benefits - they simply are forced to move out due to rising costs.
Gentrification critics decry the breakup of long-standing neighborhood communities whose
residents are forced out and independent businesses are replaced, yet proponents argue that the
infusion of new cultural capital revitalizes neighborhoods. Furthermore, they contend that
gentrification is the result of free-market processes and that not much can be done to prevent it.
After all, gentrification starts with the government.
Real estate policy and governance in the U.S. falls under the purview of local
governments, primarily incorporated cities or otherwise, the counties. Major tax revenues for
local governments are generated by property taxes, therefore, it is not surprising to find that most
local policies are structured to promote gentrification (Lees and Ley 2008). The developerdriven policies of local governments are forged to induce capital back into the city, for example,
via new transportation planning or tax incentives. But governments can also do something to
prevent gentrification through rent-controls, zoning ordinances and other anti-growth policies.
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Yet, for most large cities, particularly shrinking cities in the former manufacturing belt, the
appeal of desperately needed property tax revenues generated by new build or traditional
gentrification too enticing to passively ignore.

4.3.2 Urban Models and Gentrification

The Chicago School of sociology developed an “ecological” view of urban studies.
Central to their approach were the concepts of invasion and succession in which movement into
or out of an area affected surrounding areas. These areas were defined by Burgess (1925) to be
concentric zones, or rings. The Concentric Zone Model was empirically based on the city of
Chicago, a natural study laboratory owing to the large number of immigrants who settled there.
Burgess’ model theorized that five different zones existed: the Loop (CBD), Zone of Transition,
Zone of Workingmen’s Homes, Residential Zone, and Commuter Zone. The key zone in the
model was the Zone of Transition, which is where new immigrants first settled upon arrival due
to the low cost of housing and proximity to low-skilled jobs available in the nearby industrial
sector. This “invasion” set off successive waves of movement as other people moved out of the
Zone of Transition into the next outer zone in a pattern which would replicate itself throughout
all of the zones (the process can be conceptualized as a rock thrown into a pond which causes
subsequent wave movement). Empirical studies of modern Chicago have revealed that though
the highest-density immigrant neighborhoods are still located within Chicago, the foreign-born in
the area have also followed the path of job growth to the northwestern city suburbs, as well as
elsewhere (Greene, 1997).
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The concentric zone model later was amended into the Sector Model by Hoyt (1939) and
still later into the Multiple Nuclei Model by Harris and Ullman (1945). In the latter model,
monocentric city was replaced by polycentric city, whereby multiple nodes exert pull factors
according to their function, thus influencing the urban spatial process. Notwithstanding their
criticism, the classic urban development models have withstood the test of time. The
monocentric model predicts that higher-income groups with lower housing demand and no
children will locate closer to the city center, or transit stations, to minimize work commutes
(Kolko, 2007). In particular, studies have shown that aging baby boomers (Myers, 1990) and
gay people (Knopp, 1997) prefer to live close to the city center, which is why distance to the city
center is often used as an independent variable in gentrification studies, as it is used herein.
As it pertains to the gentrification literature, Burgess's (1925) invasion-succession model
and Hoyt's (1939) filtering model are useful for studies focused on neighborhood decline
involving the in-migration of poorer residents move into older housing recently abandoned by
wealthier residents seeking to move further away from the central city. These models are useful
for explaining the phenomenon of the decline of inner-ring suburbs in the U.S. They also have
utility for explaining settlement out on the urban fringe of metropolitan areas. However, they are
less useful for the process of gentrification, which typically, but not always, involve the inmigration of wealthier residents into poorer areas of a central city, accompanied by widespread
reinvestment into these older urban areas. But gentrification can happen outside the central city
as well and has been used for some time to “describe changes in the suburbs of some cities and
even rural areas” (Davidson & Lees, 2005).

110
4.3.3 Gentrification in Minority Neighborhoods
Racial or ethnic composition is a major contributing factor in neighborhood change and
gentrification patterns. In many studies race or ethnicity appears as a control factor. However,
in an innovative study using Google Street View to detect neighborhood change in Chicago,
Hwang and Sampson (2014) made race their central point of analysis. They found that “the pace
of gentrification in Chicago from 2007 to 2009 was negatively associated with the concentration
of blacks and Latinos in neighborhoods that either showed signs of gentrification or were
adjacent and still disinvested in 1995.” They further found that when the share of blacks was
greater than 40%, gentrification prospects diminished for that neighborhood while gentrification
favored neighborhoods with a white population above 35%. Similarly, Farley et al. (1978) found
that 40% of whites stated they would move out of a neighborhood once the African-American
population reached 33% and almost none would move into a neighborhood with more than 15%
African-Americans. Clark (1992) found that whites prefer neighborhoods which are at least 70%
white. The preference for particular neighbors is well documented within the racial dynamics
and tipping point model studies, as with Schelling (1978) who found that even minor differences
can alter neighborhood choice.

4.3.4 Gentrification in Chicago
Much of the remarkable growth around Chicago’s downtown has been driven by new
construction rather than the in-migration/displacement process customarily associated with
gentrification. Davidson and Lees (2005) argue that these new-build residential developments
do indeed represent gentrification because they involve “middle-class resettlement of the central
city, the production of a gentrified landscape, and lower income displacement in the adjacent
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residential communities” (Davidson & Lees, 2005, 1169). New build gentrification
notwithstanding, Chicago has experienced large-scale, traditional gentrification across many of
its neighborhoods. The Voorhees Center (2014) developed an index to identify Chicago
neighborhoods showing signs of neighborhood change, specifically to identify gentrification.
Using 13 socioeconomic variables, the report measured variable and index change over a period
of four decades, 1970 to 1980, 1980 to 1990, 1990 to 2000, and 2000 to 2010. While their report
identified notable instances of neighborhood gentrification, it is perhaps more notable for finding
“that decline is more prevalent in the City of Chicago as a whole” (Voorhees Center, 2014).
Several studies have documented the recent widespread level of gentrification in
Chicago’s neighborhoods (Hwang & Sampson, 2014; Vorhees Center, 2014, among others). The
issues caused by Chicago’s gentrification and population loss are multidimensional and these
problems have affected the city’s minority population particularly hard. Gentrification has
displaced many Hispanics and African-American from previously affordable neighborhoods,
while severe population loss has forced the closure of many schools and has led to the reduction
of other city services. The duality of these problems has led to accusations that policies
instituted by the city serve as a “selective containment” of poor minorities, particularly inside the
predominantly black communities of the South and West Side neighborhoods (Garcia, 2018). In
addition, Chicago’s demolition of most public housing surrounding downtown has led to
significant white population growth nearby (McDonald, 2017). As for Chicago’s suburbs,
several observations are worth noting. First, like their central city counterpart, Chicago’s innerring suburbs continue to decline in both per capita income and population, thus producing similar
problems. Second, “Chicago has a much larger Hispanic population than is typical for major
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northern metro areas in the USA” and many live in the poorer inner ring suburbs (McDonald,
2017).
This research contributes to the literature by examining the spatially varying patterns of
gentrification and its associated factors across a metropolitan area. It is to the author’s
knowledge that no gentrification studies have attempted to model such non-stationarity. This
study also contributes by using a methodology that incorporates both central city and suburbs
into the analysis, rather than solely examining the former as most studies do.
4.4 Data and Methodology
4.4.1 Study Area
The study area for this research is the contiguous grouping of census-defined places
located within the seven-county metropolitan area defined by the Chicago Metropolitan Agency
for Planning (CMAP). Specifically, the study area includes all 77 Chicago neighborhoods as well
as 238 contiguous Chicago suburbs located within Cook, DuPage, Kane, Kendall, Lake,
McHenry and Will counties in northeastern Illinois. Figure 23 shows the study area as well as
population change from 1990 to 2010. Note how severe population decline was within the South
Side of Chicago and how dramatically the outer edges of the urban fringe grew
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Figure 23. Population Change across Study Area, 1990-2010.

For purposes of running the GWR model, contiguity is required. While the places
included in this study do not comprise all of the incorporated places within the entire sevencounty area, it includes the vast majority of them. Identifying Chicago’s 238 contiguous suburbs
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for this research required inputting all place geographies within the seven-county CMAP
metropolitan region into GeoDa 1.10 (Anselin, Ibnu & Kho, 2006), where they were checked for
Rooks-contiguity using a connectivity histogram. The results indicated that 238 Chicago
suburbs had at least one contiguous neighbor and were thus included in the research. It is worth
noting here that the 335 Chicago areas included in this study had a total population in 2010 of
7,833,813, while the entire population of the seven-county CMAP region was 8,431,386,
yielding a 93% coverage rate.

4.4.2 Data
The dataset for this study was compiled from the Minnesota Population Center (2017)
which provided data from the decennial U.S. Census enumerations of 1990-2010, and the
American Community Survey (ACS) 5-year set for 2008-2012 (U. S. Census Bureau, 2018).
The dependent variable used to measure growth or decline is the change in per capita income for
each Chicago neighborhood or suburb during the 1990-2010 period relative to the level of
income change for the overall metropolitan area. The explanatory variables used in the study are
commonly found in the gentrification and urban resurgence literature and relate to age, race,
ethnicity, human capital, immigration, family status, housing stock, and distance to the central
business district. In their report on Chicago gentrification, the Voorhees Center (2014) used 13
variables to build a gentrification index. Five of those 13 variables were used for this research:
% Black, % Latino, % College Education, % Female Households, and income (note that Vorhees
used median family income while this research uses per capita income). It should be noted that
the Vorhees Chicago report used an index-based approach to identify gentrification and decline,
rather than an empirically tested model as this research does. Their report is upfront about this
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fact: “none of the aforementioned variables could be considered a priori in identifying a
neighborhood’s socioeconomic status and thus, capable of determining in a cause and effect way
that a neighborhood has upgraded or declined over time” (Voorhees Center, 2014). For this
reason, this research did not use all 13 variables by Vorhees, specifically to avoid inevitable
model issues with multicollinearity (e.g., using %Hispanic, % Black, and % White), but also for
lack of data continuity over census periods, for example with % Manager Occupations. The
descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression models for this research on Chicago
neighborhoods and suburbs (neighborhoods (77); suburbs (258), N=335) are found in Table 8.
Attribute data and geographies were collected by census tract within the city of Chicago
and then were aggregated to the 77 neighborhoods identified by the City of Chicago’s GIS
portal. The aggregated neighborhoods were then joined in a GIS to the contiguous censusdefined places within the Chicago metro area. As such, the research here places the
neighborhoods of Chicago in comparison to their metro areas, rather than considering the city of
Chicago as a single entity. This allows for individual examination of contextual neighborhood
effects rather than having the city dwarf its suburbs in the analysis. All 77 neighborhoods were
aggregated perfectly, except for the O’Hare neighborhood which proved problematic due to
overlapping census tracts belonging to different cities. For this reason, the O’Hare community
area is excluded from the analysis. The removal of O’Hare from the analysis does not
significantly affect the model output since it is primarily an industrial and commercial center
rather than residential.
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Table 8. Descriptive Statistics for Variables used for OLS Run on Chicago Neighborhoods and
Suburbs (N = 335)
Variable

Name

Change in per capita income: 1990
to 2010 (Dependent)

PERCAPINC -.000

Change in percent of college
graduates: 1990 to 2010

Mean

Std Dev.

Min.

Max.

.144

-.390

.870

COLL

.102

.082

-.110

.570

FEMLED

.036

.074

-.540

.290

Change in percent of foreign-born
from 1990 to 2010

FB

.070

.069

-.120

.300

Change in percent of persons aged
22 to 34

C22TO34

-.052

.046

-.280

.170

Distance from the areal unit
centroid to downtown

CBDDIST

33.00

19.78

.000

82.49

AGEBUILT

39.07

12.067

14

61

Percent African-American
population in 1990

PCTBLK

.151

.293

.000

.994

Percent Hispanic population in
1990

PCTHIS

.075

.121

.000

.881

Change in percent of female-led
families from 1990 to 2010

Median age of structures built

4.4.3 OLS and GWR Models
This study first builds an OLS model upon the dependent variable for Chicago’s
neighborhoods and suburbs (N = 335). Many urban empirical studies use traditional OLS
regression analysis to discern relationships between variables. The OLS model is a global model
which assumes homogeneous and stationary relationships between the dependent and
explanatory variables. It assumes that the residuals are independent and randomly-distributed
rather than spatially variant, which can sometimes be an unlikely premise when dealing with
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urban demographic and income variables. Alternatively, local regression models such as
Geographically Weighted Regression (GWR) allow for consideration of Tobler’s First Law of
Geography, whereby “everything is related to everything else, but near things are more related
than distant things” (Tobler, 1970). This notion is referred to as spatial heterogeneity (or
nonstationarity) and models such as GWR are used to test the OLS assumption of constant
relationships between variables across space.
Spatial heterogeneity is a phenomenon in spatial modelling where variable relationships
vary over space. GWR can capture spatial heterogeneity across study areas by estimating local
parameters for each geographic location (Brunsdon, Fotheringham, & Charlton, 1996;
Fotheringham, Brunsdon, & Charlton, 1997; Brunsdon, Fotheringham, & Charlton, 1998a,
1998b; Fotheringham, Brunsdon, & Charlton, 2002). By extending the traditional OLS model,
Fotheringham, Brunsdon, and Charlton (2002) represent the GWR equation as:

where the first term describes the statistical relationship at location u for parameter B based on a
weighting scheme known as a Kernel.
Weighting assumptions are critical to the GWR results. A Kernel may be fixed or
adaptive, the former is appropriate when observations are regularly positioned across similar
areal units, the latter is used when observations are clustered so that observation density varies
greatly (Fotheringham, Brunsdon, and Charlton 2002). The Kernel coefficient is dependent upon
the chosen bandwidth method, of which there are three choices. The AICc bandwidth minimizes
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the Akaike Information Criterion, the CV minimizes the Cross Validation score, while a third
option is to specify a specific bandwidth. Since observation densities and areal study units vary
greatly across the Chicago metropolitan area, this paper uses an Adaptive Kernel that minimizes
AICc bandwidth. GWR has limitations related to multicollinearity (correlation among predictor
variables) so diagnostics are used before determining the final variables (Wheeler & Tiefelsdorf,
2005).
The mapping of GWR results has proven challenging in past research. However, recent
contributions have made the presentation of GWR results more decipherable and meaningful
(Mennis, 2006; Matthews & Yang, 2012). Mennis (2006) takes issue with the common approach
of presenting GWR results where numerous class intervals are used with coefficient estimates,
often without distinguishing between all important differences of negative or positive
relationship divergence. Mennis (2006) also states that the presentation of GWR results without
accordant t-values render the model output meaningless since the reader cannot distinguish
between significant and non-significant results. Matthews and Yang (2012) tackle this problem
by mapping coefficient relationships in combination with a t-value transparency layer in the GIS.
This paper borrowed from both authors by masking out coefficients with non-significant tvalues.
Despite the issues mentioned, GWR is considered a useful tool for discovering spatially
varying relationships. It also is useful for possibly identifying missing variables within a model,
which makes GWR a valuable exploratory research tool as well.
The overall methodology as implemented is summarized as follows. The analysis begins
by running the OLS model with SPSS 22.0 (IBM Corp., Armonk, NY, USA) to observe the
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relationship between relative change in per capita income and the explanatory variables. The
OLS results are analyzed with various diagnostic checks, specifically, the variance inflation
factor (VIF) to test for variable multicollinearity, the Condition Index to check for overall model
multicollinearity, and the Wald statistic to test the model for overall statistical significance. It is
customary practice to examine whether the residuals of the OLS model are spatially
autocorrelated using a global Moran’s I analysis, which would indicate whether the OLS model
has violated the assumption of independent and normally distributed residuals (Charlton &
Fotheringham, 2009). After the OLS checks are complete, the GWR model is run within ArcGIS
(ArcMap, version 10.5; ESRI Inc., Redlands, CA, USA). The coefficients of each explanatory
variable, the R-square value, and the AICc value for both the OLS and GWR runs are compared
and summarized. Finally, the residuals and variable coefficients produced by the GWR run are
mapped in ArcGIS with only the significant values being shown.
4.4.4 Model Evaluation
Both OLS and GWR are estimated in ArcGIS 10.5. The measures of AICc and adjusted
R2 are used to evaluate the performance of OLS and GWR, according to the evaluation criteria
proposed by Fotheringham et al. (2002). A lower AICc value between two models, and a higher
adjusted R2 value indicates a better fit. The Moran’s I tool is used to test for spatial
autocorrelation in the OLS and GWR model residuals. A larger Moran’s index indicates a
greater dependency on the residuals, whereas the model with the lower Moran’s index is
considered to be a better model.
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4.5 Results and Discussion
4.5.1 Change in Per Capita Income from 1990-2010
Figure 24 shows the distribution of the dependent variable, the change in per capita
income from 1990 to 2010, across the study area. The green shaded areas indicate gentrification
while the red shaded areas indicate a decline in per capita income over the study period. Note
how the largest increases in per capita income change occurred in the peripheries of the suburban
extent while decline is seen in the inner-ring suburbs surrounding the central city of Chicago
(e.g., Berwyn). This accords with Hanlon (2008) who found a general pattern of decline in
selected older, inner-ring suburbs. Note also the green shaded neighborhoods in the northern
portion of Chicago proper (e.g., Uptown, West Town, Logan Square, among others) indicating
heavily gentrified areas, while widespread decline in per capita income can be seen in the far
southerly portion of the city (with the sole exception of Morgan Park) as well as in the
impoverished neighborhood of Austin in the west.
It must be acknowledged here that there exists no perfect measure of gentrification in the
literature (Kennedy & Leonard, 2001). Though it has been used before (Kolko, 2007), the use
herein of per capita income as a proxy measure for gentrification will not be universally
accepted. Thus, in order to buttress the locational evidence of gentrification argued herein, maps
of two other variables associated in the literature with gentrification are provided in Figures 25
and 26, namely, change in median home value and change in the college educated. In addition, it
should be noted that other studies have used a compiled index for a gentrification proxy (e.g.,
Voorhess Center, 2014, Furman Center, 2015), however, index-based research is not considered
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“capable of determining in a cause and effect way that a neighborhood has upgraded or declined
over time” (Voorhees Center, 2014).

Figure 24. Change of per capita income from 1990-2010.
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Figure 25. Change of median home value from 1990-2010.
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Figure 26. Change of persons 25 and over with bachelor’s degree, 1990-2010.
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4.5.2 OLS Results
The OLS run for the Chicago metro area (N=335) included the 77 Chicago
neighborhoods and 258 of its contiguous suburbs. Table 9 shows some of the diagnostic
measures. The adjusted R2 value was .66, meaning that OLS model accounts for 66.4% of the
change in per capita income over the study period. The Condition Index is a measure of the
multicollinearity in a regression model. Multicollinearity occurs when a model includes multiple
variables that are correlated to other explanatory variables, producing redundant effects and
unstable parameter estimates, which in turn make it difficult to assess the effect of independent
variables on dependent variables. The OLS results show that the Condition Index was 18.46,
which is less than the suggested threshold level of 30, indicating no issues with multicollinearity
among the variables. The Wald statistic had a significant chi-squared value (397), indicating
overall model significance.

Table 9: Diagnostic Results from the OLS Model (N = 335)
Model Diagnostics
R2

0.672

Adjusted R2

0.664

AICc
Condition Index
Wald

-700.68
18.46
397
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The OLS model results assume that each of the coefficients have the same universal
effect on change in per capita income throughout the entire study period. Table 10 shows the
coefficients estimated. The following variables were positively associated with the dependent
variable, change in per capita income: 1) change in percentage of college graduates from 1990 to
2010, 2) distance to downtown, 3) percentage African-American population in 1990, and 4)
percent Hispanic population in 1990. Thus, for every unit increase in these variables, there would
be an accompanying increase in the change in per capita income (1990 to 2010), holding all
other variables constant. Conversely, two variables were negatively associated with per capita
income change: 1) change in percentage of female-led families, and 2) change in percent of
foreign-born from 1990 to 2010. Thus, as an area’s percent of female-led families increased, its
change in per capita income fell. Similarly, as an area’s percent of foreign-born population
increased, the area’s change in per capita income dropped. Also, the Variance Inflation Factor
(VIF) for each individual variable ranged between acceptable values of 1.2 and 1.8. A suitable
VIF should not exceed a value of 4 to 10, otherwise serious multi-collinearity issues may arise
because the coefficient variance becomes inflated due to linear dependence with other predictors
(O’Brien, 2007). For example, a VIF of 1.6 indicates that the square of the standard error
(variance) of a particular coefficient is 60% larger than it would be if that predictor was
completely uncorrelated with all the other predictors. Of the eight explanatory variables, two
were not significant at the 0.05 level: 1) change in percent of the 22-34 year-old cohort, and 2)
median age of built structures. Thus, these two variables were dropped from the GWR run.
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Table 10: Results from the OLS model (N = 335)

Variables

Coefficients Std.

t-

value

statistic

Error

Sig.

VIF

(P-val)

Constant

-.153

.031

-4.88

.000002

----

COLL

.864

.070

12.435

.000

1.54

FEMLED

-.626

.075

-8.362

.000

1.48

FB

-.570

.073

-7.812

.000

1.20

C22TO34

.019

.122

0.156

.876

1.47

CBDDIST

.002

.000

6.871

.000

1.74

AGEBUILT

.0004

.0005

0.838

.403

1.82

PCTBLK

.145

.019

7.781

.000

1.40

PCTHISP

.273

.045

6.08

.000

1.40

Prior to comparing the OLS model to the GWR model, some final diagnostic checks were
performed to ensure the need for running GWR. The Jarque-Bera statistic returned a significant
chi-squared value (43.60), indicating that the residuals were not normally distributed. The chisquared value (52.35) of the Koenker statistic was also statistically significant, indicating
evidence of non-stationarity. The values of the Jarque-Bera and Koenker metrics indicate that
the relationship between some or all of the explanatory variables in the OLS model were not
constant throughout the study area. Furthermore, the residuals were mapped and checked for
spatial autocorrelation using Moran’s I and the results showed the residuals to be clustered, with
a positive z-score (2.39) and significant p-value (p = 0.017), indicating the presence of spatial
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autocorrelation (Figure 27). A strong tendency of OLS model residuals toward clustering is
noticeable on the residuals map indicating the presence of spatial autocorrelation. When spatial
autocorrelation is present in the residuals, the OLS assumption of the residuals’ independence is
violated. Thus, the use of GWR is warranted because it is more effective than OLS in explaining
the relationship between the change in per capita income and its associated factors. The next
step was to perform the GWR model using only the six significant explanatory variables
identified from the OLS model (it is noted here that the original 8-variable model was also run in
GWR, but the 6-variable model performed better and is thus presented here).
4.5.3 GWR Results and Model Comparison
The diagnostics from the OLS run show that the global model explains about 66 percent
(adjusted R2 = 0.664) of the variation in per capita income change across Chicago’s 335
neighborhoods and suburbs for the period 1990 to 2010. The GWR model accounts for 73.6% of
the change in per capita income over the study period, which is 7.2% higher than OLS. The
AICc is a measure of model performance useful for comparing different regression models, with
the lower AICs value indicating a better model fit to the observed data. The AICc is -701 for the
OLS model and -762 for the GWR. As evidenced by their higher adjusted R2 values and lower
AICc values, the GWR model provides a better fit for explaining relative per capita income
variability in the Chicago metro region than the OLS model. The residuals of the GWR model
are not clustered or dispersed and thus show no spatial autocorrelation, which also means that
their parameter estimates are more reliable than those derived in the OLS model. Furthermore,
the condition numbers for the GWR model were less than 30, indicating no problems with local
multicollinearity.
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Figure 27. OLS Residuals Map.

129
The GWR model also calculates an individual R2 for every location within the study area
(Figure 28). Mapping R2 provides an opportunity to see where GWR predicts well or poorly,
but it can also provide clues about missing variables due to model misspecification. For
example, the R2 results for the GWR model show stronger model performance within the City of
Chicago than in the suburbs, indicating a higher spatial dependency of the observed income
change in the neighborhoods. This may also be likely attributed to the variables chosen for the
analysis, which are commonly found in the literature. However, the gentrification literature
primarily uses central cities for the study area rather than entire metropolitan areas. Hence, it is
reasonable to assume that the variables operationalized herein may perform better in the city than
in the suburbs.
Table 11 compares the coefficient values for the six explanatory values for both the OLS
and GWR models and Figure 29 shows the mapped coefficients. The GWR model coefficients
are mapped to visualize spatial variations. As aforementioned, a simple mapping technique is
used to show only significant coefficient values. Here, a bivariate color scheme is used whereby
gradational hues of green represent a positive association between the mapped variable and the
dependent variable, while red hues indicate a negative association. All coefficient values shown
are significant at the 95% level.

130

Figure 28. Variability of Local R2 from the GWR model.
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Table 11: Coefficient Comparison for the OLS and GWR Models (N = 335)
OLS
Coefficients

COLL
FEMLED
FB
CBDDIST
PCTBLK
PCTHISP

GWR
t-values

Sig.

Coefficients

Coefficients

Low Range

High Range

.861

12.392

.000

0.37

1.19

-.631

-8.430

.000

-0.82

-0.04

-.570

-7.807

.000

-0.74

-0.39

.002

6.863

.000

0.001

0.004

.144

7.781

.000

0.07

0.30

.272

6.08

.000

0.19

0.53

Multiple studies have shown that in-migrants to gentrifying neighborhoods are collegeeducated (Freeman and Braconi, 2004; Freeman, 2005; Furman Center, 2015). The GWR model
results show that the coefficients of the college educated (COLL) are statistically significant
throughout Chicago and it suburbs (Figure 29a). The relationship of COLL to change in per
capita income is strongest in the city, where the affluent and gentrified neighborhoods of the
north contain large numbers of college graduates, while the poorer southern portion of the city
have lower rates of college education. Overall, the coefficients range from 0.37 to 1.19. As
would be expected, the relationship is positive, meaning that as the share of college graduates in
an area increase, so does the increase in per capita income. This result accords with the common
use of the variable within the gentrification literature.
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Figure 29. GWR coefficients: (a) college education (COLL); (b) change in female-led
households (FEMLED); (c) change in foreign-born population (FB); (d) distance to downtown
(CBDDIST). (continued on following page)
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Figure 29 (Continued). (e) percent of African-Americans in 1990 (PCTBLK); (f) percent of
Hispanics in 1990 (PCTHISP).
A high percentage of female-headed households has been negatively associated with
affluence since female-led households are more than often associated with lower levels of
income (Freeman, 2005; Vorhees Center, 2014). The GWR results show that this relationship
holds across the central to south and west areas, with varying effects (Figure 29b). However, the
coefficients for FEMLED are not significant in the wealthy northern suburbs. This may mean
that the level of affluence there dwarfs the effect of the variable.
Singer (2004) notes that the foreign-born population in metropolitan Chicago was 17% in
the year 2000, with 22% in the city and 15% in the suburbs. Figure 29c shows the coefficients
for the change in the foreign-born population (FB). Immigrants are less apt to become
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gentrifying in-migrants and thus its relationship to gentrification is negatively associated
(McKinnish, Walsh & White, 2010). The results show this relationship holding for the entire
study area. The coefficients for the foreign-born variable are stronger in the suburbs than in the
city, supporting the finding of Greene (1997) that Chicago is still a gateway city for immigrants,
but they are increasingly moving to Chicago’s suburbs. Greene, among others, has also noted
that immigrants in the Chicago metropolitan area have chosen to settle beyond the city’s border
into the suburbs.
The effect of the distance-to-downtown variable (CBDDIST) was strong in the outer
fringe of the northern suburbs and in a centrally located pocket of the city (Figure 29d). In fact,
a view of the mapped output of Local R2 distribution in Figure 28 above would indicate a strong
association with distance to downtown. However, distance-to-downtown was not significant for
most of the city. This is not necessarily surprising as the relationship of distance to gentrification
is muddled in the literature. In studies of central city gentrification there is “strong evidence that
gentrification in these cities was much more likely to occur in neighborhoods close to the central
business district” Timberlake & Johns-Wolfe, 2017). This evidence is partially supported by the
GWR results. Anyone who has studied neighborhood change knows that it is far from a gradual
and orderly process … neighborhoods can go up and down very quickly and land values can fall
off a cliff at the boundary between two neighborhoods (Webber & Swanstrom, 2014, 3). This
helps explain why distance is not significant for most of the city. The strong effect of the variable
in the northern suburban fringe helps support the invasion-succession process described by the
concentric zone model of Burgess (1925) whereby the wealthy move out further and further
away from the central city.

135
Two variables held significant and positive throughout the study area, the percent black
and percent Hispanic population in 1990 (Figures 29e and 29f). This indicates that
neighborhoods with large percentages of black and Hispanic in 1990 did indeed rise in relative
per capita income between 1990 and 2010. In the city of Chicago, for instance, eight of the top
eleven neighborhoods in relative income growth were over 60% black or Hispanic in 1990.
Evidence of this gentrification can also be seen in the maps of change in median home value
(Figure 25) and college educated (Figure 26). In addition, the Voorhees Center (2014) report
confirms these areas as gentrifying. The gentrifying neighborhoods with a black population over
60% in 1990 were the Near South Side, Near West Side, Grand Boulevard, Douglas, Oakland,
and Morgan Park. The gentrifying neighborhoods that were above 60% Hispanic in 1990 were
West Town and Logan Square. These findings contrast with the tipping point arguments of
Farley et al. (1978) who found that whites prefer to live in neighborhoods where whites are the
majority. Undoubtedly, the fact that changes in the Near South Side and Near West Side were
the result of new build gentrification rather than traditional gentrification processes partially
contribute to this dichotomy.
A prominent example of a Chicago neighborhood that has experienced significant
gentrification since 1990 is the South Loop, which had a very high African-American population
in 1990. The South Loop is located in the Near South Side neighborhood of Chicago. In 1990
the population of the Near South Side neighborhood was a mere 6,828 and was 92.3% AfricanAmerican, but by 2010 the population had climbed to 21,390 while the African-American
population had fallen to 27.6% (Author’s calculations based on census data retrieved from
Manson et al., 2018). McClelland (2012) notes that the South Loop, the heart of Chicago’s old
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Black Belt, had been represented by a black alderman since 1915 until the election of a white
alderman in 2003. In 1990 the South Loop consisted of dilapidated old warehouses, known as
Printers Row, and a large collection of homeless people. However, starting with the 72-acre
Central Station development in 1990, the area attracted huge investment from developers
(McClendon, 2005). In fact, new build, high-rise gentrification began occurring along around
Chicago’s central business district around this time. The three neighborhoods surrounding
Chicago’s Loop, the Near North Side, Near West Side, and Near South Side, together form an
area of high rise residential and commercial buildings known as the Super Loop. Since 1990, the
population of the Super Loop had increased by more than 82,000 residents to nearly 229,000
residents by 2010 (Kamin, 2017). Though the remarkable growth around Chicago’s downtown
has been driven by new construction rather than the in-migration/displacement process
customarily associated with gentrification, Davidson and Lees (2005) argue that these new-build
residential developments do indeed represent gentrification because they involve “middle-class
resettlement of the central city, the production of a gentrified landscape, and lower income
displacement in the adjacent residential communities” (Davidson & Lees, 2005, 1169).

4.6 Conclusion
This paper examined the spatial variations of gentrification and neighborhood change at a
metropolitan scale. GWR proved to be an effective method of analysis since it had a
considerably better fit with empirical data than the global model. The strength and direction of
association between the explanatory variables and neighborhood change was spatially
heterogeneous at the metropolitan level.

137
“Existing literature on gentrification has failed to arrive at a consensus definition of what
the (gentrification) process entails” (Kennedy & Leonard, 2001). A consensus definition in the
literature is lacking, though there is largely an agreement that displacement of persons belongs in
the definition. That said, “the greatest empirical difficulty in assessing gentrification is
determining what would have happened to individuals had gentrification not occurred” (Vigdor,
Massey, & Rivlin, 2002). Thus, an admitted weakness of the research presented here lies with
the choice of the dependent variable used to measure neighborhood change/gentrification. Per
capita income was used as a proxy measure, thus following Kolko (2007), who used median tract
income as the dependent variable to examine “the determinants of gentrification”. Admittedly,
per capita income it is not nearly a perfect measure of measure of gentrification as it is a
multidimensional process involving displacement having varying definitions. To buttress
evidence of areas identified by this research as ‘gentrified’, maps of the change in median home
value (Figure 25) and percent of college educated (Figure 26) are provided. Many papers use an
index to measure gentrification (e.g., Voorhess Center, 2014; Furman Center, 2015), however,
index-based research is also not “capable of determining in a cause and effect way that a
neighborhood has upgraded or declined over time” (Voorhees Center, 2014).
Notwithstanding these limitations, the empirical work here presents some striking
patterns. The results also suggest that the classical tipping point view regarding the association
between gentrification suppression and minimum minority population thresholds, originally
proposed generally by Farley et al. (1978) and more recently applied to race by Hwang &
Sampson (2014), may need to be modified. Indeed, the results show that of the eight most
gentrified Chicago neighborhoods in 2010, three ranked in the top ten of Chicago neighborhoods
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with the highest African-American population in 1990: the Near South Side, Near West Side,
and Grand Boulevard.
This research also contributes to the literature by unveiling a gentrification methodology
that incorporates both central city and suburbs into the analysis. This helps with the premise
argued by Davidson & Lees (2005) that gentrification is not solely a central city issue, but a
suburban one as well. Suggestions for improving the model presented herein would include
adding more relevant variables to the analysis, particularly those gleaned from the suburban and
rural based gentrification literature, rather than relying upon the central city literature as
happened here.
A recent report listed the top ten most gentrified cities in the U.S. as, in order, Portland,
Washington DC, Minneapolis, Seattle, Atlanta, Virginia Beach, Denver, Austin, Sacramento, and
New York (Maciag, 2015). Of these ten cities, only Washington DC and Minneapolis qualify as
shrinking cities. Chicago, a shrinking city, ranked as the 24 th most gentrified city out of the 50
cities in Maciag (2015) study. A major finding of this research is that the level of gentrification
in Chicago is writ large, thus displacing lower income residents mainly into the impoverished
pockets of the south and west sides of the city. It is thus hoped that the results of this study may
elucidate how neighborhood change evolves in American metropolitan areas generally, and in
shrinking cities particularly.

CHAPTER 5
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The overarching motivation of this research is to examine U.S. shrinking cities both
existentially, in terms of identifying how they differ, and also with a "cities as systems" approach
to learn more about the patterns of distribution and interaction of urban processes within a
shrinking city. Three separate articles are used to achieve this goal. This dissertation contributes
generally to the urban geography literature and specifically to the growing shrinking city
literature, as described below.
In the first study (Chapter 2), a typology was developed to differentiate and illustrate
heterogenous clusters of shrinking cities to better understand their underlying dimensionality and
better align future policy choices. The multidimensionality of urban processes makes “the need
for classification techniques, more important than before” (Reibel, 2011). Using a Geographic
Information System (GIS) and a K-means cluster analysis, seven different types of shrinking
cities were identified in this research: 1) Large Shrinking Central Cities, 2) Inner-Ring Suburbs
of Shrinking Central Cities, 3) Outer-Ring Suburbs of Shrinking Central Cities, 4) Inner-Ring
Suburbs of Growing Central Cities, 5) Outer-Ring Suburbs of Growing Central Cities, 6) Small
Shrinking Central Cities in Small Metropolitan Statistical Areas, and 7) Small Shrinking Cities in
Small Micropolitan Statistical Areas. This research extends the existing scholarship in two
ways. First, similar methodologies have been used by urban scholars to identify suburban places,
(Orfield, 2002; Mikelbank, 2004), inner-ring suburbs (Hanlon, 2009), and urban immigrant
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neighborhoods (Vicino et al., 2011), among others. Thus, this research expands the urban
classification literature in this regard. Second, the main contribution of this research is that it
helps clarify the extant definitional muddiness surrounding the term ‘shrinking city’. The
Chapter 2 results also identified a Culturally-Transforming cluster of large shrinking cities where
the percent of the foreign-born is unusually large. The average Culturally-Transforming city, of
which 16 exist, is 23 percent foreign-born, versus only a 6 percent average for the other 65 large
shrinking cities in Cluster 1A. The cities in the Culturally-Transforming cluster have
experienced less of an increase in poverty levels than the other shrinking central cities, thus
demonstrating how immigrants populations in shrinking cities have perhaps ameliorated both
population and economic decline.
An admitted shortcoming of this research methodology is that identified clusters are not
wholly homogenous across variable traits within the sub-clusters. For instance, some of the
cities in Cluster 7, labeled as Small Shrinking Cities in Small Micropolitan Statistical Areas,
contain much heterogeneity within their datasets. Due to methodological constraints, not all
identified clusters will contain wholly homogenous members. Despite this shortcoming, this
research advances the shrinking city literature by demonstrating that not all shrinking cities are
the same. Knowing that identifiable sub-clusters of shrinking cities exist, many with inherent
spatial and structural between them, leads to a better understanding of the shrinkage problem. It
is hoped that the empirical results of this study may inform the shrinking city literature and
public policy by helping researchers and policy makers better understand the subtle differences
between groups of shrinking cities and address possible solutions accordingly.
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Chapter 3 examined an extant problem within a large shrinking city. Many shrinking city
studies could benefit from lessons learned about Detroit’s foreclosure problems. Detroit’s
largesse of shrinkage problems, e.g., abandonment, vacancies and, notably, properties sold at
foreclosure auctions, exist there at a level that allows study. Elsewhere, other shrinking cities
may possess the same problems, but at a scale too small for examination. Thus, the lessons
learned from problems in Detroit can be applied elsewhere to shrinking cities either to address
budding similar problems, or in a preventative manner. Research on Detroit significantly
advances urban studies, “not in spite of Detroit’s decline but rather because of its decline”
(Dewar et al., 2015). While urban geography is replete with studies focusing on conditions of
growth, few studies examine how cities manage decline (Galster 2012). The Detroit study
employed a three-step methodology to examine property foreclosures. It used Kernel Density
Estimation (KDE) to visualize hot spots of foreclosure activity, Moran’s I to detect spatial
autocorrelation, and the local Getis-Ord Gi* to identify clusters of foreclosure activity. One of
the findings of the study is that Detroit property foreclosures are clustered and correlate with
neighborhood decay. This finding upholds the results of other studies, e.g., Alm et al. (2016),
who examined the impact of property tax delinquency on the sales price of nearby residential
properties and found that unsold properties with a tax lien increased neighborhood decay.
An important finding of this research is that the auction process in Detroit is incongruent
with the city’s right-sizing planning goals. The stated goal of right sizing in general, and the
DFC plan in particular, is to phase out municipal services in large sections of the city by
reducing or eliminating population in certain zones for purposes of service provision efficacy.
Yet over 50,000 parcels were auctioned rather than retained by the city and in return many of
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those parcels were later foreclosed upon again or fell back into tax delinquency. Particularly
troublesome is the fact that the City of Detroit has missed numerous opportunities to acquire
parcels in the airport neighborhood cheaply, if not for free. The development of the airport could
bring huge revenues down the line. The city began parcel acquisition 1994, so it made no sense
to let nearly 400 parcels near the airport slip out of the city’s coffers by offering them to the
foreclosure auction.
Perhaps the most obvious indictment of the property tax foreclosure system in Detroit is
that 7.3% of foreclosed parcels end up being foreclosed upon again. Time and time again the
foreclosure system keeps pumping new owners into properties located within clearance zones,
while the city planners are working frantically to remove residents from these zones. Simply
put, Detroit is operating under a property tax foreclosure system that serves neither its citizens
nor its own stated planning goals.
In summary, this research upholds the findings of Dewar (2009) who concluded that
programs such as Wayne County’s foreclosure and auction 1) fails to reduce the number of
owner-occupants losing their homes, 2) fails to strengthen neighborhoods, 3) encourages
multiple auctions on the same properties, and 4) ultimately fails to return individual properties to
productive use. The results of this study affirm her findings and further concludes that the
overall auction process in incongruent with the City of Detroit’s stated planning goals.
As for policy implications, this research agrees with the suggestions of Mogk (2014) to 1)
reduce the large number of tax exempt properties which are currently receiving costly city
services while not contributing to the tax rolls and 2) remove the TIF policies currently
benefitting downtown at the expense of the neighborhoods. To these suggestions, this research
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adds a third policy suggestion: to place a moratorium, renewable annually, on property tax
foreclosures in Detroit. This would allow home owners and/or renters to stay in their homes,
give neighborhoods the opportunity to stabilize during the resurgence currently happening in
Detroit, remove the market scourge of speculative and absentee owners, and provide a window to
policy makers with which to gauge the real estate market and to assess the direction of
neighborhood decline or improvement. It also would prevent more properties from being
haphazardly accumulated by land banks, the county, the city and derelict owners, all lacking a
cohesive plan for right-sizing Detroit.
In the third study presented here (Chapter 4), Geographically Weighted Regression
(GWR) was used to examine the spatial variations of gentrification and neighborhood change in
the Chicago metropolitan region. GWR proved to be an effective method of analysis since it had
a considerably better fit with empirical data than the global model. The strength and direction of
association between the explanatory variables and neighborhood change was spatially
heterogeneous at the metropolitan level.
A major finding of this research is that the gentrification process operationalized within
metropolitan Chicago largely upholds the foundational theories of invasion and succession put
forth by Burgess (1925) and Hoyt (1939). However, the results also suggest that the classical
tipping point view regarding the association between gentrification suppression and minimum
minority population thresholds, originally proposed by Farley et al. (1978) and more recently by
Hwang & Sampson (2014), may need to be modified. Indeed, the results show that of the eight
most gentrified Chicago neighborhoods in 2010, three ranked in the top ten of Chicago
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neighborhoods with the highest African-American population in 1990: the Near South Side, Near
West Side, and Grand Boulevard.
This research also contributes to the literature by unveiling a gentrification methodology
that incorporates both central city and suburbs into the analysis. This helps with the premise
argued by Davidson & Lees (2005) that gentrification is not solely a central city issue, but a
suburban one as well. It is thus hoped that the results of this study may elucidate how
neighborhood change evolves in American metropolitan areas generally, and in shrinking cities
particularly. Suggestions for improving the model presented herein would include adding more
relevant variables to the analysis, particularly those gleaned from the suburban and rural based
gentrification literature, rather than relying solely upon the central city literature. More
importantly, the development of a more reliable proxy for gentrification, rather than per capita
income, would be a welcome addition to the literature. Nonetheless, the GWR methodology
used for the Chicago research may be applicable to any gentrification study.
In conclusion, This dissertation presents three studies related to shrinking cities in the
U.S. Using central cities as the focus, Chapter 2 identified seven clusters of shrinking cities.
One of the revelations of that study is that over 25% of America’s shrinking cities are located in
just seven metropolitan areas. Two of those metropolitan areas are anchored by the central cities
of Detroit and Chicago. Detroit has experienced a level of population loss and economic decline
far greater than Chicago. Hence, the focus of Chapter 3 is on examining an intracity process
extant on a scale only experienced by cities having undergone severe shrinkage, namely, the tax
foreclosure auction of seized properties. The Detroit study shows the inefficiencies of that
process relative to the right-sizing planning goals it has adopted. Relative to Detroit, Chicago is
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more integrated with its metropolitan area and the effects of its population loss have not been as
devastating, nonetheless, it too is a shrinking city as are many of its suburbs. In fact, across the
Chicago metropolitan area are 18 shrinking cities. Thus, the focus of Chapter 4 is an intrametropolitan examination of neighborhood and suburban income change. Specifically, the
Chicago study focuses upon the spatially varying effects variables associated with neighborhood
change.
The urban shrinkage literature is wide and varied, this dissertation can only examine a
mere fraction of its relevant topics. The results of Chapter 2 identified Cluster 1A as shrinking
central cities, 1B as shrinking inner-ring suburbs, and 1C as shrinking outer-ring suburbs.
Detroit is the iconic example of a Cluster 1A city, having declined in population by over 60
percent since 1950. The right-sizing planning efforts adopted there are also being adopted by
other Cluster 1A cities. It is with this in mind that the research contained in Chapter 3 is
presented. Chicago, which has declined in population by 26 percent since 1950, has within its
metro area 13 shrinking inner-ring suburbs (Cluster 1B) and four shrinking outer-ring suburbs
(Cluster 1C). Thus, the research presented in Chapter 4, focusing upon the spatially varying
effects of factors associated with neighborhood change across a metro-wide area, may be useful
to urban scholars. As mentioned, shrinkage is a multidimensional problem. So care must be
shown when generalizing the results of this dissertation since any particular city’s decline is
ultimately the result of “economic, historical, cultural, and political circumstances (that) differ
from context to context” (Hollander, & Nemeth, 2011).
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From a literature standpoint, in addition to contributing to the urban shrinkage discourse,
this dissertation helps connect shrinkage to the extensive body work examining gentrification.
“While last centuries problem was declining city populations and sprawl, the 21st centuries
problem can appear totally opposite” (Silliman, 2016). People are moving in droves to the
central city and many are wondering, “Does gentrification harm the poor” (Vigdor, Massey, &
Rivlin, 2002). Vigdor et al. (2002) do not answer their own question directly, instead they
implore researchers to continue studying the causes of gentrification. Chapter 4 of this research
examines gentrification within a shrinking city, Chicago. Chicago is well-recognized as an area
of widespread gentrification, but what about gentrification in other shrinking cities? Until
recently there has not been much connection between urban shrinkage and gentrification, simply
because many shrinking cities were not considered desirable places in which to live. As for
Detroit, a 2013 report stated that only 2 percent of its tracts had gentrified (Hartley, 2013). Other
scholars have recently argued that gentrification “is connected to the large-scale divides that
separate growing from declining cities” (Florida, 2013). But shrinking cities across the country,
suffering the economic effects from a shrinking population base, have reinvigorated their
downtowns as entertainment venues and that has drawn residents in from the suburbs. As a
result, current residents are becoming displaced. Anyone who has recently visited Detroit might
easily draw parallels to East Berlin in 1991 - construction booms dominate the downtown
landscape. Will that capital investment produce spillover effects that benefit the neighborhoods?
If so, policy makers in Detroit and other shrinking cities may soon have to tackle the
gentrification issue. Whether it is sprawl in the suburbs or gentrification in the cities, the free
market mechanism remains the driving force in this country. Gentrification can bring
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substantially needed revenues to a shrinking city, but it also brings displacement and other
unwanted change. Similar to other gentrified cities, shrinking city policy makers will have to
decide how to provide affordable living communities while achieving sustainable development.
As noted by Silliman, “While declining urban populations and now rapid growth appear
opposite, they are the result of an inability in American development to create sustainable
communities” (Silliman, 2016). Civic leaders, even those in shrinking cities, must decide how
to increase accessibility to jobs, social services, and amenities while promoting sustainable
growth. Thus, this dissertation helps contribute to the beginning discourse in the blending of the
urban shrinkage and gentrification literature, a concept that would have appeared
phantasmagorical a short while ago.
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